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2Abstract
Under what conditions are states more likely to trade-off human rights when coop-
erating on sensitive areas of international security? We now know that during the
post-9/11 period, a number of countries have cooperated with the United States
of America on a range of controversial security matters. The clandestine nature of
counterterrorism cooperation makes it difficult to study the causes and dynamics
of trading off security and human rights in international politics directly. How-
ever, one example of these post-9/11 practices (extraordinary rendition) has the
advantage of being observable (ex-post), as we can analyse detainee testimony and
suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publicly available data. This
thesis capitalizes on an opportunity to provide theoretically driven and empirically
testable answers to questions on the causes and consequences of contentious forms
of international security cooperation. What influenced more than a quarter of the
world’s countries to participate in rendition, secret detention and interrogation op-
erations during the post-9/11 period? What explains the variation in the political
costs of participation in the post-9/11 Central Intelligence Agency extraordinary
rendition, secret detention and interrogation programme? This dissertation fo-
cuses on the tension between common and conflicting interests among states and
between parties and voters to answer these questions. This thesis provides a sub-
stantive contribution to international relations literature by suggesting both which
countries are more likely to tradeoff human rights and cooperate with one another
on contentious security issues and which domestic environments are most likely
to generate the greatest political costs for getting caught. The main findings from
this thesis have important policy implications and provide academics and advo-
cacy researchers with new tools for detecting human rights violations and holding
states to account where previous efforts have failed due to a lack of evidence.
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71 Introduction
Previous international relations literature proposes that we are more likely to
observe cooperation between states with common interests. If both parties agree
on the topic under negotiation, cooperation is more likely to be mutually beneficial
and less likely to involve either actors making large sacrifices (Jervis, 1978; Axelrod
and Keohane, 1985). If this is the case, why do we observe states cooperating with
one another on a number of issues that they fundamentally disagree on?
A state’s decision-making process in a bargaining situation is based on a cal-
culation of the costs and benefits of cooperating versus not cooperating (Altfeld,
1984). In many cases, the costs of not cooperating (or the benefits of cooperating)
can overshadow the preferences that a state has on a given issue. For example,
during a nuclear disarmament negotiation a party may go into negotiations with
an unwillingness to compromise on reducing their production of nuclear weapons.
However, if it transpires that declining to cooperate could lead to a reprisal of
some kind (e.g. economic sanctions) then they may be more likely to trade-off a
preference between the right to nuclear energy and economic stability.
Similarly, a state may be more willing to trade-off their interests if they can
secure favors through cooperation. For example, a temporary member of the
United Nations (UN) Security Council may be willing to trade-off their preference
on the outcome of a particular resolution (ex-ante) and change their vote in order
to receive more aid from a permanent member (such as the United States of
America (U.S.)). The balance of power between negotiating parties is a crucial
aspect as a stronger country can have greater leverage in a bargaining situation;
including the ability to manipulate the perception of payoffs for a weaker state
(McKinlay and Little, 1977; Zimmerman, 1993; Katzenstein et al., 1998; Alesina
and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008). Therefore,
we should be more likely to see country’s trading preferences when the country
seeking cooperation is a hegemon.
The tension between common interests and conflicting interests should be even
more prevalent for those countries that regularly cooperate with one another as
8the consequences of cooperation and conflict in one issue area can contaminate
other issue areas in international politics (Keohane, 1986).
This thesis contributes to literature on the tension between common interests
and conflicting interests by focusing on the causes and consequences of interna-
tional security cooperation on sensitive issues during the post-9/11 period. One
of the most controversial aspects of the War on Terrorism (WoT) includes the hu-
man rights violations committed by the U.S. and some of the countries involved.
Notable examples include the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison (Iraq),
Bagram prison (Afghanistan) and Guantánamo Bay (Cuba) by the U.S. Military
Officials as well as the alleged torture of civilians perpetrated by British Armed
Forces in Iraq (Vulliamy, 2013).
Most shockingly, in late 2005 it was discovered that the U.S. had been running
a global rendition network that saw the transfer of Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) terrorist suspects to secret detention sites where they faced interrogation
and torture (Mayer, 2005). Extraordinary rendition operations used private civil-
ian aircrafts to conceal detainee transfers and were most active between 2001 and
2005. International cooperation in rendition, secret detention and interrogation
(RDI) included states hosting CIA secret detention sites; providing airports for
rendition flights to rest, refuel and regroup; sharing intelligence during detainee
interrogations; and carrying out the arrest, capture, detention and interrogation
of detainees on behalf of the CIA (United Nations, 2010). Over 50 countries were
suspected of cooperating in these secret counterterrorism operations including a
number of established democracies (Open Society Foundations, 2013). Why did
so many countries cooperate in rendition when doing so placed their commitment
to human rights in jeopardy? What motivated countries such as Canada and
Sweden (heralded as the global “gold standard” for human rights promotion) to
participate (Brysk, 2009)?
One week after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, states around the world faced a
decision concerning their allegiance to the U.S. and the WoT – “either you are with
us or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001). In the area of international security
9and counterterrorism, states frequently have to make a choice between upholding
their legal obligations to human rights and strengthening national security. States
have to pursue many national security policies in secret in order for them to be
effective but when a government has discretion over what information is kept
secret, there is the potential for abuse to take place (Colaresi, 2014).
In liberal democracies, the tension between preferences on the rule of law and
security will be even greater given the prevalence of institutions and laws that
constrain government behaviour and enable citizens to respond to moral and legal
concerns. However, when states receive reassurance that cooperation on a sensitive
issue will remain secret and the country seeking cooperation is a dominant power,
democracies are just as likely to trade off human rights in the name of national
security.
Nevertheless, identifying states with common interests on human rights and
national security issues is a critical step for international cooperation in clandes-
tine security matters when the costs of being caught include revealing classified
plans to an enemy and threatening political survival at home. Countries that view
security dilemmas and human rights trade-offs in a similar light should not only
be cheaper to buy off (and require less persuasion to cooperate in the first place)
but should also be less likely to disclose sensitive information that is detrimental
to the group since cooperation can be seen to enhance every member’s national
security.
An interesting implication of international security cooperation on sensitive
issues is the extent to which the political costs associated with being caught matter
in practice. In theory, we should expect leaders and governments in democratic
countries to be punished when it is discovered that they have violated human
rights. However, this is not always the case. For example, following the revelation
at the end of 2005 that over a quarter of the world’s countries participated in the
RDI programme, only a small number of democracies have incurred political costs,
including electoral defeats. What explains the variation in the political costs of
international security cooperation on controversial issues?
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Previous international relations literature has established that the public un-
derstands that there are times that the government has to operate in secret – and
that in exceptional circumstances they face a pragmatic trade-off between security
and human rights (Ignatieff, 2005; Colaresi, 2014; Wike, 2016). Accordingly, we
should expect the political costs associated with being caught for violating hu-
man rights to be greater for those governments whose behaviour contradicts their
public positions on human rights and national security to a greater extent.
Consequently, international security cooperation on sensitive issues should be
more risky for left of centre governments because of the perception that they
are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security (Welch
and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014). This revelation is more
likely to cause a grievance among voters who think they share common interests on
human rights and security trade-offs with (in this case liberal voters); leading core
voters to vote for another left of centre party or withdraw from voting altogether
(McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver, 2003).
Political scandals that reveal greater differences in a party’s public and private
type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility
as a government (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Tomz, 2007). It is essential to take
into account the party orientation of a government when considering the conse-
quences of international security cooperation on sensitive issues as the presence
of democratic institutions (designed to prevent such behaviour taking place) do
not always guarantee that perpetrators will be held to account.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I present a deterministic model that can be
used to identify international cooperation in RDI operations using public flight
data and information on rendition flight characteristics. The secret nature of
counterterrorism cooperation has left previous research on rendition plagued by
uncertainty, an absence of data and systematic empirical evidence (Efrat, 2015;
Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010). Therefore, before diving into an analysis of
the causes and consequences of international cooperation in this sensitive area of
international politics, it is essential to establish how many countries cooperated
11
- and to what extent. My analysis identifies 307 new likely rendition flights and
15 previously unidentified countries potentially involved. This section contributes
to a wider discussion within the field of political science that considers how to
deal with the issues involved in measuring partially observed processes, such as
repression and human rights violations.
The second chapter of this thesis explores why countries participated in the
RDI programme. This clandestine security coalition becomes particularly intrigu-
ing when we take a closer look at the diverse group of states alleged to have
collaborated with the U.S. and consider how core international relations theories
fail to fully explain this form of cooperation. I argue that due to the sensitive
nature of cooperation required, the U.S. screened countries according to their pref-
erences on human rights-security trade-offs. I use UN General Assembly (UNGA)
voting data to measure human rights preferences and find that states with com-
mon interests to the U.S. on human rights were more likely to participate. This
analysis makes a substantive contribution to the field of international relations
by explaining patterns of cooperation under conditions of secrecy and bridges the
gap between theory from international security literature and empirical research
on rendition.
In the third chapter of this thesis, I explain the variation in the political costs
of participation in the post-9/11 RDI programme. I argue that the revelation of
cooperation in rendition had a disproportionate negative effect for those govern-
ments that are expected to prioritise the promotion of civil liberties over national
security interests. I use data on party orientation and find that left of centre gov-
ernments were less likely to be re-elected following this revelation because their
behaviour contradicted most with the interests of liberal voters on human rights.
This section makes a valuable contribution to the field of international relations
by exploring the factors that make cooperation in contentious security operations
costlier for states.
In sum, this thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the field of international
relations by helping us to understand under what conditions human rights are
12
more likely to be traded off for national security – and what the consequences are
for countries that engage in this enterprise. The clandestine nature of counterter-
rorism cooperation makes it difficult to study these dynamics directly. However,
the practice of extraordinary rendition has the advantage of being observable (ex-
post), as we can analyse detainee testimony and suspected extraordinary rendition
flight paths using publically available data. This thesis capitalizes on an opportu-
nity to provide theoretically driven and empirically testable answers to questions
on the tension between common interests and conflicting interests on sensitive
issues in the area of international security. Beyond the topic of rendition, the
theoretical arguments and novel rendition flight data developed in this thesis can
be used to scientifically evaluate other international security and foreign policy
issues. This research can also be useful both for investigative researchers and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) interested in using the findings for advocacy
purposes and forecasting which countries are more likely to cooperate with one
another on sensitive issues in international security.
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2 Measuring Extraordinary Rendition and International Co-
operation
2.1 Abstract
Following the launch of the WoT, the U.S. established a global rendition network
that saw the transfer of U.S. CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across
the world. There has been considerable debate over how many countries partici-
pated in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period, and conventional accounts
of foreign complicity suggest that diverse countries were involved, including many
established democracies. However, research on rendition has continually suffered
from uncertainty, a lack of data, and systematic empirical evidence due to the
secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation. In this chapter, I argue that it is
possible to study the practice of rendition, unlike many other forms of clandestine
security cooperation, as it is partially observable. Specifically, suspected extraor-
dinary rendition flight paths can be tracked using publicly available flight data.
This chapter uses the world’s largest set of public flight data relating to rendition
to estimate cross-country collaboration in RDI activities. The result suggests 307
likely rendition flights and 15 new participating countries beyond the 54 known
cases.
2.2 Introduction
At midday on February 17 2003, the Egyptian Cleric and former Militant Islamist
Abu Omar, was walking down a street in Milan, Italy when he was stopped by the
police and forced into a white van. Inside, the CIA blindfolded and beat him while
he was driven to a U.S. airbase in Aviano, Italy and rendered to Cairo, Egypt on
a Gulfstream IV Jet (via a U.S. airbase in Ramstein, Germany). Over the next
four years he was tortured in secret detention facilities in Egypt on behalf of the
CIA (Council of Europe, 2008; Amnesty International, 2009).
After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. launched a secret rendition network enabling
the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites (All Party Parlia-
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mentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 2014). Extraordinary rendition operations used private civilian air-
crafts to conceal detainee transfers. They are believed to have been most active
between 2001 and 2005, and had the assistance of over a quarter of the world’s
countries (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013a; Open Society Foundations, 2013). Inter-
national cooperation in RDI operations included states hosting CIA secret deten-
tion sites; providing staging posts for rendition flights to rest, refuel and regroup;
sharing intelligence during detainee interrogations; and carrying out the arrest,
capture, detention and interrogation of detainees on behalf of the CIA (United
Nations, 2010).
How many countries participated in the RDI programme during the post-9/11
period – and to what extent? The most frequently cited account of foreign com-
plicity is the Open Society Foundations (2013) Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret
Detention and Extraordinary Rendition report, this points to 54 countries (a di-
verse set of states which included many of the world’s established democracies)
being involved.1 However, there has been considerable debate over how many
countries participated in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period. For exam-
ple, the European Parliament and Council of Europe concluded their correspond-
ing investigations into the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the
transport and illegal detention of prisoners with different lists of countries (in Eu-
rope and elsewhere) that they suspected were involved (Council of Europe, 2006a;
European Parliament, 2007). Similarly, while Blakeley and Raphael (2013b) iden-
tify over 400 “highly suspicious” flight circuits that land in a total of 81 countries
across the globe, the United Nations (2010) only include 20 countries in their
allegations concerning involvement in secret detention practices in the WoT since
11 September 2001 (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b; United Nations, 2010).
This characteristic is not unique to the task of determining the number of coun-
1Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Croa-
tia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan,
Yemen, and Zimbabwe (Open Society Foundations, 2013).
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tries that were involved as there are also conflicting accounts concerning many
other details of the WoT RDI programme. For example, during the early years of
the WoT, there were reports that thousands of CIA terrorist suspects had been
processed through the rendition “system” (Campbell and Norton-Taylor, 2008;
Hooper, 2009). Whereas, recent investigations on U.S. RDI operations have only
been able to confirm the identity of 131 individuals subjected to the CIA’s De-
tention and Interrogation Program (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013c; Open Society
Foundations, 2013; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). The secret na-
ture of counterterrorism cooperation has left previous qualitative research plagued
by uncertainty, an absence of data and systematic empirical evidence (Efrat, 2015;
Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010). In addition, many governments have been
reluctant to admit to their participation in rendition due to national security
concerns or political and legal consequences (Brysk and Safir, 2007).
Together these factors have made it difficult to estimate the countries involved
in rendition as well as the number of cases of secret detention during the post-
9/11 period. This chapter contributes to a wider discussion within the field of
political science that considers how to deal with the issues involved in measur-
ing partly perceptible processes such as repression and human rights violations.
Brysk (1994) describes the systematic measurement of complex political processes
as “the first critical step” in quantitative research. Recent research in international
relations and human rights has continued this call by emphasising the importance
of adopting measured and careful analyses grounded in accurate data (Dancy and
Fariss, 2017; Fariss, 2014). By revisiting the debate over how many countries par-
ticipated in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period, and providing a more
accurate estimate of international cooperation, this chapter fills a gap in the liter-
ature that can facilitate further studies on this topic by academic researchers and
human rights practitioners. For example, the data produced by this chapter pro-
vide new opportunities for international security researchers to analyse the causes
and dynamics of international cooperation under conditions of secrecy hidden by
their intrinsic nature.
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Beyond extraordinary rendition, these findings might be used to predict future
counterterrorism cooperation and evaluate the characteristics of those countries
that are more or less likely to engage in similar kinds of repressive behavior in
secret. The results can also be useful both for investigative researchers and NGOs
interested in using the data for advocacy purposes; particularly those states that
have continued to enjoy impunity from their actions due to a lack of evidence.
How can we measure international cooperation in such a deeply sensitive area
of international politics? Unlike other forms of clandestine security cooperation,
the practice of rendition has the advantage of being observable, as we can analyse
suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publicly available flight data.
Past attempts to identify and track the aircraft used by the CIA as part of the post-
9/11 RDI programme include The Rendition Project – headed by Professor Ruth
Blakeley, University of Kent and Dr Sam Raphael, University of Westminster.
Blakeley and Raphael (2013a) map more than 11,000 individual flights related to
rendition and identify more than 60 rendition flights that closely match known
dates when prisoners were moved between secret prisons.
However, this analysis only accounts for the transfer of 34 individuals into CIA
custody, and leaves a vast gap between the number of confirmed prisoners that
were enrolled into the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program (Blakeley and
Raphael, 2013a; Open Society Foundations, 2013; Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 2014). Also, this method is likely to undercount actual rendition
flights, and could be problematic for instances where the identity of individuals
subjected to CIA rendition cannot be revealed due to national security concerns.
To overcome these limitations in identifying rendition flights and the countries
likely involved, I apply data pre-processing methods to the Rendition Project
Database of flights (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b). I build a Rendition Flight
Specification Model based on the characteristics of confirmed high profile detainee
renditions and estimate binary outcomes for more than 11,000 flights related to
rendition. My results suggest an additional 307 rendition flights that are identi-
cal in every observable way to known renditions and 15 previously unidentified
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countries. This research shows how systematic empirical analysis of international
cooperation in post-9/11 RDI operations is possible using public flight data, and
provides a more general foundation for research to measurement challenges on
international security and human rights events.
2.3 Data and Methods
The Rendition Project database represents the world’s largest collection of pub-
lic flight data possibly related to rendition, comprising 11,000 individual flights
landing in 136 countries for the period 2001–2012 (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b).
Blakeley and Raphael (2013a) compile their dataset by gathering flight data from
several European intergovernmental investigations, government and parliamen-
tary inquiries, NGOs and investigative journalists. The original data result from
numerous Freedom of Information requests made to air navigation organisations
(such as Eurocontrol and the Federal Aviation Agency) showing the flight plans
of aircrafts suspected of being used for extraordinary rendition purposes. Every
flight within the dataset contains information on the aircraft; flight route; com-
panies involved in each journey; and suspected detainees onboard (see Appendix
2.1). By producing an interactive flight database that visualizes the flight path
of every flight in the dataset on a world map, Blakeley and Raphael (2013a) uti-
lize the data to identify more than 60 rendition flights that closely match known
dates when prisoners were moved between secret prisons. This process tracing
analysis has been underpinned by a range of primary material including prisoner
testimonies, declassified documents, flight records, company invoices,and court
documents (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013a). This chapter looks beyond this lim-
ited number of flights to uncover further flights within the dataset that share the
same characteristics of known renditions but where the transfer of a detainee is
unknown (due to the secret nature of these operations).
While the data are dyadic and record a flight between two airports, interna-
tional cooperation in rendition is best understood in terms of rendition circuits.2
2A flight circuit captures the aircraft’s journey from start to finish and is made up of several individual flights
where each leg represents a single flight from a departure airport to an arrival airport, and flights are considered
part of the same flight circuit that took place on the same aircraft, on the same day (+/- 1 day).
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Due to the limited size of the private civilian aircrafts used by the CIA, rendition
operations tended to include a series of flights where aircrafts could rest, refuel
and regroup (commonly in Western Europe) during a long journey from the U.S.
to secret detention sites located in Eastern Europe, North Africa and Asia (Open
Society Foundations, 2013). Despite a detainee only being onboard the aircraft for
one or two legs of the circuit, the detainee transfer would not be possible without
these additional flights, as explicitly stated in the UN’s model of international
counterterrorism cooperation in secret detention (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: International Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation Post-
9/11.
(a) Hosting Central Intelligence Agency secret detention facilities
(b) Assisting with the arrest, capture, detention and interrogation of detainees
(c) Sending or receiving intelligence or interrogation questions
(d) Providing staging posts for rendition flights to rest, refuel and regroup
Source: (United Nations, 2010).
The dependent variable in the analysis is binary, namely whether a flight is
likely to be a rendition flight or not. The proposed model is deterministic and
assigns degenerate probabilities to each flight within the dataset, based upon its
similarity to confirmed high profile detainee renditions.3 Flights are classified as
likely rendition flights (i.e. 1) if they demonstrates all of the typical characteristics
of a rendition flight listed in Table 2.2 and are classified as likely non-rendition
flights (i.e. 0) if they fail to satisfy any one of these conditions (Blakeley and
Raphael, 2013d; Council of Europe, 2008; European Parliament, 2006a; Open
Society Foundations, 2013; Raphael et al., 2015; United Nations, 2010). This
conservative appoach builds upon previous research on extraordinary rendition
and directly correspond to the structural qualities of known rendition flights that
can be observed using public flight data.
First, a flight must land within close proximity to a confirmed CIA secret
detention site after September 11 2001. Second, the circuit must also include a
3This group of flights necessarily includes detainee renditions that have been at the center of a major inter-
governmental investigation into rendition or high profile legal case linking the aircraft to a confirmed detainee
transfer (American Civil Liberties Union, 2007; Council of Europe, 2008; European Parliament, 2006a; Redress,
2014; United Nations, 2010).
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Table 2.2: Rendition Flight Specification Model (Dummy Variables).
(a) Flight lands within close proximity to a confirmed Central Intelligence Agency secret
detention site
(b) Flight lands at a well-known staging post during the circuit
(c) Aircraft has been previously used during past renditions of detainees
(d) Flight lands at Washington Dulles International Airport during the circuit
flight to a well-known staging post where previous flights connected to a high
profile detainee rendition landed at in order for the aircraft to rest, refuel and
regroup. Third, the aircraft flight registration number must also have been used
during high profile detainee renditions in the past (Open Society Foundations,
2013; United Nations, 2010). Finally, the circuit must also include a flight that
landed at Washington Dulles International Airport, where confirmed high profile
detainee rendition circuits typically began and completed their journey in order
to pick up and drop off rendition teams (see Appendix 2.2 for the content of all
the covariates) (Council of Europe, 2008; Shane, 2005).
This objective framework differs from previous research on rendition in avoiding
reliance on speculation and circumstantial evidence to identify rendition flights
(Blakeley and Raphael, 2013a). For example, this measurement model does not
require a flight to match known dates when prisoners were moved between secret
prisons that could result in over fitting. There are many security reasons other
than rendition that the CIA may wish to contract a private civilian aircraft for;
moreover, luxury aircrafts are also routinely booked by corporate and private
clients for a range of personal and business purposes.
I use matching to preprocess the public flight data and measure extraordinary
rendition. Flights are matched on exactly the same values of the covariates out-
lined in the Rendition Flight Specification Model in Table 2.2 and discarded if
they do not exhibit any of these features. The matched dataset is divided into
treatment and control groups, whereby flights assigned to the treatment include
the 61 rendition flights identified by Blakeley and Raphael (2013a) and flights
assigned to the control include new flights identified by this chapter (Ho et al.,
2007).
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The particular algorithm for matching that has been selected for this analysis
is exact matching; which ideally finds multiple matches within the Blakeley and
Raphael (2013b) dataset on all of the individual variables contained within the
Rendition Flight Specification Model (Morgan and Harding, 2006). Flights within
the control group are identical in every observable way to their confirmed rendition
flight counterparts within the treatment group (Gu and Rosenbaum, 1993). This
approach represents the first attempt to systematically quantify the uncertainty
of identifying rendition flights during the post-9/11 period.4
2.4 Results
The results support the idea that confirmed high profile rendition flights share
measureable common characteristics that enable us to predict the likelihood of
other previously unconfirmed rendition flights. The results from the model are
shown in Table 2.3 and suggest 307 new likely rendition flights within the Rendi-
tion Project Database and 15 previously unidentified participating countries.
Table 2.3: Results from Matching.
Sample sizes
Control Treated
All 10916 61
Matched 1218 61
Discarded 9698 0
Matched sample sizes
Subgroup Treated Control Total Detention Staging Aircraft Washington
1*** 43 307 350 Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 10 83 93 Yes Yes Yes No
3 4 155 159 Yes No Yes Yes
4 1 32 33 Yes No Yes No
5 3 641 644 No Yes Yes Yes
***, subgroup containing those flights most likely to be rendition flights.
Successful matches are found for 1218 observations while 9698 units are dis-
carded due to their distinct dissimilarity to the 61 previously identified rendition
flights. The successfully matched sample is then disaggregated into five subgroups.
Previous unidentified rendition flights (control group) share the exact values on
4Specifically, I use matching as a data pre-processing procedure. Unlike many studies that use matching
as a pre-processing procedure for causal inference to ensure balancing on the observed covariates, I use it to
set specific criteria to identify flights that have the same characteristics as known rendition flights. Although
matching could potentially produce the same information as a truth table, it also provides valuable additional
information such as the likelihood that each flight will meet these conditions. For instance, since the values of all
the covariates are binary, this process produces five categories with varying degrees of similarity from Subgroup
1 (most similar) to Subgroup 5 (least similar); the procedure can also be easily used for replication.
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each of the covariates to confirmed rendition flights (treatment group) within the
same subgroup (see Table 2.3). I interpret flights in the first subgroup as most
likely to be rendition flights given that they meet all of the conditions outlined
in the Rendition Flight Specification Model. Flights within the second subgroup
satisfy all but the fourth indicator, that is, a flight within the same circuit landing
at Washington Dulles International Airport.5 Flights within the third subgroup
meet every requirement outlined in the Rendition Flight Specification Model ex-
cept for landing at well-known staging posts where rendition flights in the past
had landed to rest, refuel and regroup.6 Flights within the fourth subgroup only
demonstrate half of the characteristics outlined in the Rendition Flight Specifica-
tion Model, that is, a flight landing in a secret detention site and taking place on
an aircraft used during past renditions. Finally, flights within the fourth subgroup
fail to satisfy the most important condition, namely landing in a secret detention
site. Figure 2.1 represents the distribution of the various subgroups in the analysis
over the period 2001–2012.
Matching Stage ‘0’ represents the distribution of flights over time in the original
dataset prior to matching. Matching Stage ‘1’ represents the first actual stage of
matching and includes only those flights which satisfy the first condition within
the model, requiring a potential rendition flight to land within close proximity to a
confirmed secret detention site. This stage discards 9712 flights from the matching
model but still includes flights that run from each of the annual extremes of the
dataset. Next, Matching Stage ‘2’ reduces the distribution of flights over time
from 2001–2007 and discards 354 flights from the model that do not satisfy the
first and second condition outlined in the Rendition Flight Specification model
requiring a flight to land within close proximity to a confirmed secret detention site
and land at a well-known staging post used during past renditions. Accordingly,
Matching Stage ‘3’ includes those flights which land at a secret detention site,
5While these flights shall not be taken into consideration, it is entirely possible that aircrafts may not have
had a chance to return to their home bases between rendition operations or that rendition teams allegedly based
in Washington Dulles International were already stationed in the field (Reprieve, 2012).
6Accordingly, many of these flights include journeys directly from Washington Dulles International Airport
to secret detention sites such as Guantánamo Bay. One can consider many security reasons as to why private
civilian aircraft might have been contracted to such destinations aside from detainee transfers – including the
sending of CIA interrogators to secret detention facilities.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Flights During Each Stage of Matching.
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Matching Stage 0 represents the original dataset prior to matching, while matching Stages 1–4 represents each
phase of matching.
also land at well-known staging post used during past renditions, and take place
on an aircraft contracted by the CIA for rendition purposes. This third stage
of matching discards 468 flights from the model and reduces the distribution of
flights within the dataset overtime from 2001–2006. Finally, the fourth stage
of matching includes the 350 flights contained in Subgroup 1 that satisfy every
covariate within the Rendition Flight Specification Model (including that a flight
within the circuit also landed at Washington Dulles International Airport). This
final stage of matching discards 93 flights from the model. This indicates that the
most likely rendition flights were confined to the period 2001–2005 with majority
taking place between 2003 and 2004. These findings tell a story that is consistent
with the historical events that took place during the early years of the WoT (see
Figure 2.2).
For example, we should expect few flights in 2001 compared to subsequent
years, since rendition operations did not officially start until the end of 2001 after
23
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Identified Rendition Flights.
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the 9/11 attacks (Fitzpatrick, 2003). The increase of flights in 2002 coincides with
the presidential authorisation permitting the CIA to use enhanced interrogation
techniques on detainees (Andrew and Tobia, 2014). Similarly, the peak around
2003 and 2004 coincides with the U.S. Justice Department drafting a memo au-
thorising the CIA to transfer detainees out of Iraq for interrogation (Radnofsky,
2008). Moreover, the drop in flights in 2005 follows the release of the “Torture
Memos” in 2004 that provided the legal basis for approval of the mistreatment of
detainees during the WoT (Allen and Priest, 2004). In 2006, the CIA secret pris-
ons were closed and prisoners were transferred to Guantánamo Bay or in some
cases released (Cornwell, 2006). This finding links patterns in rendition flights
to the U.S. government’s need for support from global public opinion to obtain
successful international cooperation on other areas (Hafner-Burton and Shapiro,
2010).
By tracking the flight paths of suspected extraordinary rendition aircrafts, one
can analyse all of the flights within a circuit; including those that facilitate the
refueling of an aircraft before and after the transfer of a CIA terrorist suspect to
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a secret detention site where they face the risk of torture (see Figure 2.3). Figure
2.3 maps the frequency of rendition circuits by countries based on the identified
likely rendition flights in Subgroup 1.
Figure 2.3: Frequency of Rendition Circuits.
Frequency of Rendition Circuits
1 141
Frequency of Flights, with Darker Shades Indicating Higher Values, and White for Countries not Identified by
the Analysis (Excluding the U.S.).
The most frequently visited secret detention sites within Subgroup 1 include
96 flghts that land in Kabul between 2002 and 2005. This is not surprising since
several CIA secret prisons were reportedly established within close proximity to
Kabul International Airport after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan in October 2001 (Reprieve, 2015). After Afghanistan, the next five
secret detention sites that receive the greatest amount of likely rendition flights are
located in Amman, Jordan (65 flights), Cairo, Egypt (43 flights), Rabat, Morocco
(37 flights), Baghdad, Iraq and Tashkent, Uzbekistan (both 28 flights each). All
of these flights take place between 2001 and 2005, in line with previous research
on rendition, which claims that, the CIA frequently outsourced interrogations to
detention facilities within these countries (Irish Times, 2007; Urry, 2014). See
Appendix 2.3 for the full country list of rendition flights.
25
On the other hand, countries that received the greatest number of flights within
a rendition circuit (beyond the aforementioned countries where secret detention
sites were located and the U.S.) include Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and
the UK. Such countries have been at the center of high profile governmental
inquiries and investigations on state complicity in rendition (All Party Parliamen-
tary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; State Watch, 2009). See Appendix
2.4 for the full country list of rendition circuits.
The UN’s model of international cooperation in rendition post-9/11 in Table
2.1 demonstrates that state participation in the RDI system was far from uniform
and involved countries participating in a varying number of ways. Figure 2.4
display two examples of new rendition flight circuits identified by the matching
model which pass through Norway (red circuit) and Kazakhstan (blue circuit).
Figure 2.4: Example of New Rendition Circuits.
During mid-September 2005, flight data relating to the Norway circuit records
a previously used rendition aircraft, with the tail number N248AB, flying from
Miami, U.S. to one of the CIA’s most famous detention sites located in Guan-
tánamo Bay. The aircraft is then observed flying to a frequently used staging
post in Shannon, Ireland, before landing in Kabul, Afghanistan where a number
of confirmed CIA secret prisons were located. The next day, the aircraft is then
observed flying straight to Bergen, Norway before heading back to Washington,
DC, US. On the other hand, flight data related to the Kazakhstan circuit docu-
ment the same previously used rendition aircraft, with the tail number N248AB,
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completing a return flight from Teterboro, New Jersey, U.S. to Toronto, Canada
before departing from Washington, U.S. during mid-October 2003 and flying to
the same staging post based in Shannon, Ireland. The aircraft is then recorded
as landing in Baghdad, Iraq and finally Almaty, Kazakhstan.
The identification of 15 new countries potentially involved in this secret ren-
dition network, could have important implications for the concerned states if it
is proven that they knowingly participated in or condoned rendition.7 While the
secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation imposes serious constraints on being
able to externally validate these key findings with high degrees of certainty, tri-
angulating new results with reliable qualitative evidence is a crucial step. I shall
demonstrate this point by presenting two examples of how novel results from the
data can be cross-verified with findings from a robust selection of sources. For
example, while there have been no formal allegations made against Qatar, a sub-
stantial body of qualitative reports allege that a CIA secret detention site was
located in the country. As a key participant in Operating Enduring Freedom,
Qatar is known to have offered the U.S. and its allies use of the Al Udeid Airbase
– where detainees were reportedly imprisoned in secret and interrogated (Mayer,
2005).
On the other hand, despite public opposition to the Iraq War in 2003, a num-
ber of news sources have revealed that the U.S. and France regularly cooperated
in secret during the WoT. This included the establishment of a covert intelli-
gence center in 2002 in Paris that tracked the movement of terrorist suspects
and organized operations to capture them (Priest, 2005a). In addition, a crim-
inal investigation was opened in 2005 following a complaint that two aircrafts
had landed in France suspected of transporting CIA prisoners. The investigation
concluded with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs explaining that they could
not exclude the possibility that CIA flights had landed on French soil (European
Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, 2009). France was also one of thir-
teen governments who maintained administrative silence during an investigation
7Brazil, Dominican Republic, France, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Qatar, Senegal,
Seychelles, South Korea, Tajikistan, and Tunisia (see Appendix 2.4).
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that used the right of access to enquire about the landing of flights associated
with extraordinary rendition (Reprieve and Access Info, 2011).8 This brief exer-
cise demonstrates the valuable contribution that this chapter makes towards our
understanding of international cooperation in RDI beyond the known 54 cases,
when its inferences are coupled with credible qualitative evidence.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
How many countries participated in the RDI programme during the post-9/11
period – and to what extent? The clandestine nature of counterterrorism cooper-
ation makes it difficult to study this directly, and previous research on rendition
has continually suffered from uncertainty and a lack systematic data and empir-
ical evidence. This chapter provides a unique contribution to a wider discussion
within the field of political science that considers how to deal with the issues in-
volved in measuring partially observed processes, such as repression and human
rights violations (Brysk, 1994; Dancy and Fariss, 2017; Fariss, 2014). I seek to
overcome these common challenges by creating a deterministic model to identify
international cooperation in extraordinary rendition. Despite its secret nature,
potential international cooperation in rendition can be measured using publicly
available flight data and information on flight characteristics. This provides an
ideal opportunity to expand our understanding of international cooperation in
sensitive areas of international politics and empirically test relevant theoretical
arguments.
In addition to the 61 previously identified rendition flights and 130 individuals
confirmed to be subjected to CIA detention and interrogation during the post-9/11
period (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013c; Campbell and Norton-Taylor, 2008; Hooper,
2009), there are likely to be many more detainees possibly unaccounted for. My
analysis identifies 307 new likely rendition flights and 15 previously unidentified
countries potentially involved. This provides a new and improved rendition indi-
cator that can be used to scientifically evaluate international security and foreign
8The majority of these countries are known to have been involved in RDI operations; Albania, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Cape Verde, Georgia, France, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Russia, Spain, and Turkey (Open
Society Foundations, 2013)
28
policy issues, as well as a template for how challenging international politics and
human rights events can be studied using insight from matching data mining
analyses.
However, the conservative research design adopted in this chapter warrants
further discussion. For example, while the deterministic approach of measuring
extraordinary rendition and international cooperation (that assigns a degenate
distribution to the probability of a flight being a rendition flight) reduces the like-
lihood of overcounting rendition flights, it runs the risk of undercounting them
instead. For example, any flight in the (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b) dataset
that does not meet every condition outlined in the rendition flight specification
model (Table 2.2) is automatically excluded from being considered as a likely ren-
dition flight. This strict criteria results in 30% of previously confirmed rendition
flights recieving the incorrect classification (i.e. non-rendition flights). While the
structural differences between these flights in the data (displayed in Table 2.3) are
described within the text, the deterministic approach prevents a deeper consider-
ation of those flights that fail to satisfy just one or two of the typical character-
istics of a rendition flight. Moving forward, I would like to extend this research
by using a proabilistic method (such as propensity score matching) to measure
extraordinary rendtion and international cooperation. This process would assign
probabilities to all flights between 0 and 1 and enable us to evaluate the degree to
which flights within the dataset are more or less similar to previously confirmed
rendition flights.
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2.6 Appendicies
Appendix 2.1: New Flight Data Variables.
Variable Description
Flight identification (ID): Unique flight ID
Flight registration: Aircraft registration number
Year: Year that the flight took place
Date: Date of flight
Date maximum: Only circuit start and end dates are given
Departure time: Flight departure time
Arrival time: Flight arrival time
Departure ICAO9: ICAO code for departure airport
Arrival ICAO: ICAO code for departure airport
Departure country: Country that the flight departs from
Arrival country: Country that the flight arrives in
Departure city: City that the flight departs from
Arrival city: City that the flight arrives in
Departure airport: Airport that the flight departs from
Arrival airport: Airport that the flight arrives in
Circuit ID: Unique Circuit ID
Circuit code: Unique Circuit ID (flight registration-circuit
start-circuit end)
Circuit continues: Flight directly continues from previous flight
(dummy variable)
Circuit total: Total number of flights in the circuit
Circuit start: Start date of the circuit
Circuit end: End date of the circuit
Parallel flight*: Inconsistencies in flight data
Circuit category*: Classification of rendition circuit
Circuit notes*: Additional comments on flight
Flight notes*: Additional comments on circuit
Detainees*: Detainees suspected to be on board flight
Companies*: Corporations suspected to be involved in flight
Source*: Source where the flight data originates
Detention site: Flight lands in close proximity to a secret deten-
tion site (dummy variable)
Staging actual: Flight lands at a frequently used staging post for
renditions (dummy variable)
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Staging post: Circuit contains flight that lands at a frequently
used staging post (dummy variable)
Rendition aircraft: Aircraft previously used for rendition purposes
(dummy variable)
Washington actual: Flight lands at Washington Dulles International
Airport (dummy variable)
Washington Dulles: Circuit contains flight that lands at Washington
Dulles International Airport (dummy variable)
Known rendition: Flight identified by Blakeley and Raphael
(2013b) as a rendition flight (dummy variable)
Non-rendition: Flight identified by Blakeley and Raphael
(2013b) as non-rendition flight (dummy variable)
Rendition flight: Flight identified by my analysis as a rendition
flight (dummy variable)
Rendition circuit: Circuit contains a flight identified by my analysis
as a rendition flight (dummy variable)
*Variable constructed by Blakeley and Raphael (2013b).
9International Civil Aviation Organization.
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Appendix 2.2: Rendition Flight Specification Model Covariate Content.
Secret detention site
ICAO10 code Airport City Country
OAKB Kabul International Kabul Afghanistan
OAIX Bagram Air Base Bagram Afghanistan
OAKN Kandahar Kandahar Afghanistan
LQSA Sarajevo International Sarajevo Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina
LQTZ Tuzla International Tuzla Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina
MUGM Leeward Point Field Guantánamo Bay
Naval Station
Cuba
HDAM Djibouti-Ambouli Djibouti Djibouti
HECA Cairo International Cairo Egypt
HAAB Bole International Addis Ababa Ethiopia
GBYD Banjul International Banjul Gambia
ORBI/ORBS Baghdad International Baghdad Iraq
OJAI/OJAM Queen Alia
International/Amman-
Marka International
Amman Jordan
HKJK Jomo Kenyatta Inter-
national
Nairobi Kenya
HLLT/HLLM Tripoli Interna-
tional/Mitiga
Tripoli Libya
EYVI Vilnius International Vilnius Lithuania
GMME Rabat-Salé Rabat Morocco
OPRN Benazir Bhutto Inter-
national
Islamabad Pakistan
OPKC Jinnah International Karachi Pakistan
EPSY Szczytno-Szymany In-
ternational
Szymany Poland
LRBS/LROP Băneasa Interna-
tional/Henri Coandă
International
Bucharest Romania
VTBD Don Mueang Interna-
tional
Bangkok Thailand
UTTT Tashkent International Tashkent Uzbekistan
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OYSN Sana’a International Sana’a Yemen
Staging Post
ICAO code Airport City Country
UBBB Heydar Aliyev Interna-
tional
Baku Azerbaijan
LCLK Larnaca International Larnaca Cyprus
LKKV Karlovy Vary Interna-
tional
Karlovy Vary Czech Republic
LKPR Ruzyně International Prague Czech Republic
EDDF Frankfurt am Main In-
ternational
Frankfurt Germany
ETAR Ramstein Air Base Ramstein Germany
LGAV Eleftherios Venizelos
International
Athens Greece
BIKF Keflavik International Reykjavík Iceland
EINN Shannon Shannon Ireland
LIRA Ciampino Rome Italy
RJBB Kansai International Osaka Japan
EPWA Warsaw Chopin Warsaw Poland
LPAZ Santa Maria Vila do Porto Portugal
LPPR Francisco de Sá
Carneiro
Porto Portugal
LRTR Timişoara Traian Vuia Timişoara Romania
FSIA Seychelles Interna-
tional
Mahe Island Seychelles
LEPA Palma De Mallorca Palma de Mallorca Spain
LTAG İncirlik Air Base Adana Turkey
EGPK Glasgow Prestwick
Airport
Glasgow UK
FJDG Diego Garcia Naval
Support Facility
Diego Garcia UK
EGGW London Luton London UK
OMDB/OMDM Dubai Interna-
tional/Al Minhad
Air Base
Dubai United Arab Emirates
Rendition aircraft
10International Civil Aviation Organization.
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Aircraft registration Aircraft type Companies
N63MU Gulfstream IV Airborne/First Flight, Interna-
tional Group, Baseops Interna-
tional, Universal Weather and
Aviation
N288KA Gulfstream III Air Castle, Kookabura Air,
Worldwide Jet Charter
N85VM Gulfstream IV Assembly Point, Richmor Avia-
tion, Air Routing International
N379P Gulfstream V Bayard Foreign Marketing, Pre-
mier Executive Transport Ser-
vices, Aerocontractors, Jeppe-
sen Dataplan
N724CL Boeing 727 Classic Limited Air/Clay Lacy
Aviation, Universal Weather
and Aviation
N248AB Gulfstream IV Gulfstream Acquisitions, Prime
Jet
N614RD Gulfstream IV International Group, Universal
Weather and Aviation
N313P Boeing 737 Keeler and Tate Management,
Premier Executive Transport
Services, Stevens Express
Leasing Inc, Aerocontractors,
Jeppesen Dataplan
N829MG Gulfstream III Presidential Aviation Interna-
tional, Universal Weather Avi-
ation
N308AB Gulfstream IV Prime Jet, Baseops Interna-
tional, International Trip Plan-
ning Services
N982RK Gulfstream III Richmor Aviation, Air Routing
International
N787WH Boeing 737 Southern Aircraft Services Inc,
United States Aviation Com-
pany, Victory Air Transport,
Baseops International
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N1HC Gulfstream V United States Aviation Com-
pany, Air Routing International
Washington Dulles International Airport
ICAO code Airport City Country
KIAD Washington Dulles Washington United States
Sources: European Parliament (2006a); American Civil Liberties Union (2007); Council of Europe
(2008); United Nations (2010); Blakeley and Raphael (2013d); Open Society Foundations (2013); Redress
(2014).
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Appendix 2.3: Country List of Rendition Flights.
Country Frequency Year (minimum) Year (maximum)
Afghanistan 96 2002 2005
Albania 2 2004 2004
Algeria 3 2003 2004
Azerbaijan 4 2003 2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 2003 2004
British Indian Ocean Territory (UK) 3 2002 2004
Cuba 27 2002 2005
Cyprus 18 2002 2004
Czech Republic 14 2003 2004
Djibouti 11 2003 2004
Dominican Republic 1 2004 2004
Egypt 47 2001 2004
Ethiopia 1 2005 2005
France 1 2005 2005
Gambia 2 2002 2002
Georgia 1 2002 2002
Germany 64 2001 2004
Greece 6 2001 2002
Indonesia 1 2002 2002
Iraq 28 2003 2005
Ireland 21 2002 2005
Italy 6 2002 2004
Japan 2 2002 2003
Jordan 65 2001 2005
Kazakhstan 1 2003 2003
Kenya 4 2003 2003
Kuwait 1 2003 2003
Libya 22 2003 2005
Malta 1 2004 2004
Morocco 37 2002 2004
Norway 1 2005 2005
Pakistan 17 2001 2004
Poland 20 2002 2003
Portugal 21 2002 2005
Romania 8 2003 2004
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Senegal 1 2003 2003
Seychelles 2 2004 2004
South Korea 1 2003 2003
Spain 16 2004 2005
Sri Lanka 3 2003 2003
Sweden 2 2001 2001
Thailand 6 2002 2004
Tunisia 2 2004 2004
Turkey 3 2002 2003
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) 6 2002 2004
United Arab Emirates 15 2002 2004
United Kingdom 28 2001 2005
United States 26 2001 2005
Uzbekistan 28 2001 2003
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Appendix 2.4: Country List of Rendition Circuits.
Country Frequency Year (minimum) Year (maximum)
Afghanistan 96 2002 2005
Albania 2 2004 2004
Algeria 8 2001 2004
Austria 2 2002 2002
Azerbaijan 11 2002 2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 2003 2004
Brazil* 3 2004 2004
British Indian Ocean (UK) 4 2002 2004
Canada 11 2002 2004
Cuba 27 2002 2005
Cyprus 39 2002 2004
Czech Republic 35 2003 2004
Djibouti 11 2003 2004
Dominican Republic* 1 2004 2004
Egypt 50 2001 2004
Ethiopia 1 2005 2005
France* 3 2004 2005
Gambia 2 2002 2002
Georgia 2 2002 2002
Germany 141 2001 2004
Greece 12 2001 2002
Hong Kong 1 2003 2003
Iceland 6 2004 2004
Indonesia 2 2002 2002
Iraq 28 2003 2005
Ireland 91 2001 2005
Italy 13 2002 2005
Jamaica* 1 2004 2004
Japan* 6 2002 2003
Jordan 66 2001 2005
Kazakhstan* 1 2003 2003
Kenya 4 2003 2003
Kuwait* 3 2003 2003
Libya 22 2003 2005
Malta* 3 2004 2005
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Morocco 37 2002 2004
Norway* 2 2005 2005
Pakistan 18 2001 2004
Poland 24 2002 2003
Portugal 43 2002 2005
Qatar* 1 2003 2003
Romania 11 2003 2004
Senegal* 2 2003 2003
Seychelles* 2 2004 2004
South Korea* 2 2003 2003
Spain 35 2001 2005
Sri Lanka 4 2003 2003
Sweden 2 2001 2001
Tajikistan* 3 2001 2004
Thailand 8 2002 2004
Tunisia* 2 2004 2004
Turkey 11 2002 2005
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) 9 2002 2004
United Arab Emirates 23 2002 2004
United Kingdom 86 2001 2005
United States 471 2001 2005
Uzbekistan 28 2001 2003
*,15 new participating countries beyond the 54 known cases (Open Society Foundations, 2013)
.
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3 The Causes and Dynamics of International Cooperation
in Extraordinary Rendition
3.1 Abstract
Following the launch of the WoT, the U.S. established a global rendition network
that saw the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the
world. Conventional accounts of foreign complicity show that 54 diverse countries
were involved, including many established democracies. What influenced more
than a quarter of the world’s countries to participate in RDI operations during
the post-9/11 period? Given the sensitive nature of cooperation required, I argue
that the U.S. screened countries according to their preferences on human rights-
security trade-offs. Countries with similar preferences to the U.S. on human rights
were cheaper to buy off and would have required less persuasion to cooperate.
This theory is consistent with the existing claim that cooperation is more likely
between countries with similar preferences as both actors are better off when the
partnership increases. I test this hypothesis on global data using UNGA voting
data as a measure of common interest, and the analysis provides robust empirical
support for my theoretical argument.
3.2 Introduction
Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. launched a secret rendition network that
enabled the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites around the
world (All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). RDI practices would not have been
possible without international cooperation. Outsourcing arrests, detention and
interrogations to a third country was essential as it meant that the process took
place out of public view; unconstrained by the due legal process on U.S. territory
(Mayer, 2005; Satterthwaite, 2006). Moreover, due to the limited range of the
private civilian aircrafts used by the CIA to conceal detainee transfers, the U.S.
required a number of countries to allow flights to land discretely at their airports
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(Open Society Foundations, 2013). Unlike other forms of secret counterterrorism
cooperation, the practice of extraordinary rendition has the advantage of being
observable (ex-post), as we can analyse detainee testimony and suspected ex-
traordinary rendition flight paths using publically available data.11 However, very
little is known as to why states became involved in this deeply sensitive area of
international politics. What influenced more than a quarter of the world’s coun-
tries (including many established democracies) to participate in RDI operations
during the post-9/11 period?12 This puzzle is magnified by the political and so-
cioeconomic diversity of the states alleged to have collaborated in this clandestine
security alliance - ranging from Sweden and Canada to Iran and Zimbabwe.
I argue that the U.S. screened countries according to their human rights pref-
erences, given the sensitive nature of cooperation required. The most desirable
RDI partners should view security dilemmas and human rights trade-offs in a
similar light to the U.S.. Countries with similar preferences to the U.S. on hu-
man rights are cheaper to buy off and should have required less persuasion to
cooperate. In order to obtain support from the international community during
the WoT and maintain counterterrorism cooperation, the U.S. needed to ensure
that their RDI programme remained secret. Global public opinion of the U.S.
declined during the establishment of the WoT, particularly during times when
reports of human rights abuses were exposed; threatening its support from allies
(Pew Research Center, 2007; Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010). Therefore, it was
crucial that the U.S. avoided approaching countries that could decline cooperation
and risk leaking contentious counterterrorism plans. Cooperation in RDI opera-
tions offered participants a mutually beneficial partnership that was expected to
strengthen every member’s national security (Jervis, 1978; Axelrod and Keohane,
1985). Countries with closely aligned preferences and a vested interest in the out-
11This has been made possible by a series of Freedom of Information requests and reports on foreign complicity
in the global rendition network from European intergovernmental investigations, government and parliamentary
inquiries, NGOs and Investigative Journalists (European Parliament, 2006a; Council of Europe, 2008; All Party
Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; United Nations, 2010; Reprieve and Access Info, 2011).
12Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Croa-
tia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, UK, Uzbekistan, Yemen and
Zimbabwe (Open Society Foundations, 2013).
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comes of counterterrorism cooperation would make more reliable partners as they
are less likely to disclose classified information that is detrimental to the group.
To test my hypothesis, I use UNGA voting data to measure similar human
rights preferences (Voeten, 2013) and a novel approach to identify rendition flights
(Cordell, 2017). Results from the analysis indicate support for my theoretical ar-
gument. These results are robust to a series of different model specifications shown
in the results section and appendicies. This chapter provides a first account of
the causes and dynamics of international cooperation in RDI practices during the
post-9/11 period from a quantitative perspective (Raphael et al., 2015; Colaresi
and DiBlasi, 2017). This analysis makes a substantive contribution to the field of
international relations by explaining patterns of cooperation under conditions of
secrecy and bridging the gap between theory from international security literature
and empirical research on rendition.
3.3 International Cooperation During the Post-9/11 Period
Like many other aspects of the WoT, the RDI programme would not have been
possible without international cooperation (National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks upon the United States, 2002). All forms of cooperation were bilateral, be-
tween the U.S. and a country that could provide a particular service. While some
states hosted CIA secret detention sites, others carried out the arrest, capture,
detention and interrogation of detainees on behalf of the CIA, shared intelligence
during detainee interrogations, and provided staging posts for rendition flights to
rest, refuel and regroup at their airports (United Nations, 2010). This clandes-
tine security coalition becomes particularly intriguing when we take a closer look
at the diverse group of states alleged to have collaborated with the U.S. (from
Australia and Ireland to Syria and Libya) and consider how core international
relations theories fail to fully explain this form of cooperation.
For example, one might expect to observe cooperation between allies since
defence pact members are obliged to come to the aid of their alliance partners in
times of need (Long et al., 2000; Marinov et al., 2015).13 Allies are more trust-
13This does not mean that alliances are always fully reliable. Many studies emphasise the importance of country
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worthy and reliable as these states know that they will be dealing with each other
repeatedly in the future; reducing the incentives to exploit a situation and weaken
the alliance (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Kupchan and Kupchan,
1995; Fearon, 1998). States are more likely to exchange favors with friends and
take great risks in order to maintain their international and domestic positions
and reputations (Levy, 1997; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004). However, this argu-
ments fails to fully account for international cooperation in RDI operations as
only 28% of countries that participated had formal alliances with the U.S.. For
example, longstanding U.S. allies such as France and Mexico did not participate
but non-allies such as Iran and Zimbabwe did (see Figure 3.1). Moreover, when
the mean of the Alliance variable is compared across this chapter’s sample, there
is no signficant difference between those countries that we know cooperated in
RDI operations and those that did not (at the 95% confidence level).
Figure 3.1: International Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation (Al-
liances).
Collaboration in rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations visualised according to the Open Society
Foundations (2013), with light blue representing non-U.S. allies, dark blue indicating U.S. allies, and white for
countries not identified as being involved.
Similarly, previous research suggests that democracies are less likely to violate
characteristics (e.g. regime type and power-status), treaty content and the compatibility of state interests in
shaping the creditability of alliances (Smith, 1995; Long et al., 2000; Leeds, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004).
43
human rights because of the domestic costs that would result if detected (Dav-
enport, 2007; Vreeland, 2008; Conrad, 2014). Countries with liberal democratic
institutions should be less likely to engage in repression as their behaviour is con-
strained by domestic and international legal commitments (Kelley, 2007; Rejali,
2009; Davenport et al., 2008). However, this also fails to explain international co-
operation in RDI, since as many as 40% of participating states were democracies,
including established democracies such as Denmark and Sweden. Moreover, when
the mean of the Regime Type variable is compared across this chapter’s sample,
there is no signficant difference between those countries that we know cooperated
in RDI operations and those that did not (at the 95% confidence level).
On the other hand, past studies would predict cooperation from states with
high levels of terrorism threat because of shared grievances with the U.S. and
the opportunity to defeat a common enemy and foil potential attacks on their
territory (Lai and Reiter, 2000; Sandler, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Kroenig,
2009). A state’s decision to engage in harsh counterterrorism approaches also
depends upon the policies of other countries experiencing similar levels of threat
from terrorism to avoid becoming the softest target in a peer group (Neumayer
et al., 2014). However, 43% of the countries that participated in RDI operations
actually faced low levels of terrorism threat, with participating states such as
Finland and Portugal not experiencing a single terrorism attack in the ten years
that preceded 9/11. Moreover, when the mean of the Terrorism (log) variable is
compared across this chapter’s sample, there is no signficant difference between
those countries that we know cooperated in RDI operations and those that did
not (at the 95% confidence level).
Conversely, perhaps we should expect to observe cooperation from states that
are more dependent on the U.S. since hegemonic actors can better use sanctions
effectively to secure desired policy outcomes when the balance of power is un-
equal (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Zimmerman, 1993; Alesina and Dollar, 2000;
Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008). As a result, we should expect
countries with financial linkages to the U.S. to be more likely to collaborate in
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clandestine security matters since refusing to cooperate could place valuable eco-
nomic transactions in jeopardy (Hufbauer et al., 1990; Nooruddin and Payton,
2010).14 Along the same lines, we might expect countries with smaller popula-
tions to band wagon and ally with a great power like the U.S. in order to increase
their defense capability and reduce their relative vulnerability (Rothstein, 1968;
Jervis, 1978; Walt, 1985). However, these explanations also fail to explain varia-
tion in international cooperation in RDI. For example, between 40%-49% of the
countries that cooperated had low levels of U.S. trade and aid, and 66% had a
large population size above the global median. Moreover, when the means of the
Trade%GDP and Aid%GDP variables are compared across this chapter’s sample,
there is no signficant difference between those countries that we know cooperated
in RDI operations and those that did not (at the 95% confidence level). However,
on average, countries with smaller populations did cooperate and the mean of the
Population (log) variable between the two groups is statistically different (at the
95% confidence level).
Past research on the importance of domestic politics suggests that we might
expect to observe more cooperation from right wing governments, as such parties
are more likely to implement policies that strongly prioritise national security over
civil liberties (Imbeau et al., 2001; Welch and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neu-
mayer et al., 2014). Country leaders play a major role in determining the political
and economic policies of the country; with party ideology informing the general
approach that is taken as well as the outcome (Jones and Olken, 2005; Dreher and
Jensen, 2012). However, we find quite the opposite, as 81% of the countries that
participated in RDI operations had left-of-centre governments (including countries
such as Canada and the UK). Moreover, when the mean of the Party Orientation
variable is compared across this chapter’s sample, there is no signficant difference
between those countries that we know cooperated in RDI operations and those
that did not (at the 95% confidence level).
14While economic sanctions literature tends to focus on punishment as a possible outcome of asymmetric
relationships in international politics, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014) report on the CIA’s
detention and interrogation programme also revealed how financial rewards had been distributed to countries
that hosted CIA secret prisons including payments of $15 million USD.
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Given these largely null findings, what influenced more than a quarter of
the world’s countries to participate in this deeply sensitive area of international
politics? I argue that the secret nature of the RDI programme imposed an entirely
different dynamic on alliance formation that core international relations theory is
ill-equipped to explain. Participation in this clandestine security network carried
far greater public costs than other forms of cooperation due to the human rights
abuses involved in these operations. This is particularly true for many established
democracies with a strong domestic rule of law that are expected to honour their
commitments to international law de facto (Kelley, 2007). In addition to causing
negative public opinion that could foreseeably threaten a leader’s popularity and
survival, several governments complicit in RDI operations have had to compensate
victims of torture and fund investigations into their alleged illegal activity after
it was revealed that they cooperated.
For the U.S., the domestic and international costs associated with a leak
ranged from hindering counterterrorism progress and threatening national secu-
rity, to triggering negative public opinion among the electorate, and gaining a de-
ceitful reputation that could hinder international relations (Guisinger and Smith,
2002; Satori, 2002; Wike, 2016). There are several examples where revelations
that threatened exposing details of the programme shaped state behaviour and
the structure of the programme itself. For example, a leak to the New York Times
in 2002 regarding the location of a secret detention site in Thailand allegedly led
directly to its closure, and important details in the Washington Post in 2005 about
the programme caused Romania to demand that a secret prison on their territory
was shut down (Miller and Goldman, 2014).
As a result, it is likely that the U.S. would have had to be far more selective
concerning the countries that it approached in order to prevent public opposition
from states. Given the unpopular global opinion ratings of the U.S. during the
WoT (particularly during times when human rights abuses were exposed) it would
be surprising if countries that had refused to cooperate neglected the opportunity
to capitalize on public outcry (Pew Research Center, 2007; Hafner-Burton and
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Shapiro, 2010; Weaver, 2014).15
Given these costs, what motivated more than a quarter of the world’s coun-
tries to agree to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period in
the first place? It has been well established by literature across political science
that government decisions are primarily driven by a desire to preserve their sur-
vival and strengthen their national security (Legro, 1996). Becoming a member
of the network was expected to enhance a state’s security at the domestic and
international level. For example, a former senior Romanian Intelligence Official
acknowledged that Romania had agreed to host a CIA secret detention site in
order to demonstrate their commitment to the U.S. and secure their integral sup-
port for National Atlantic Treaty Organization membership, that they acquired
alongside RDI partner, Lithuania in 2004. Failure to cooperate with the U.S.
would foreseeably have led to country leaders facing sanctions in other areas of in-
ternational politics that placed their national security and international standing
in jeopardy (Leventoglu and Tarar, 2005).16
In addition, unlike conventional domestic defensive counterterrorism tactics
(such as increasing security in public places), cooperation in RDI operations pre-
sented countries with a unique opportunity to prevent terrorism attacks every-
where by proactively seeking to dismantle the Al Qaida network. While many
citizens and countries have condemned foreign complicity in RDI, proactive coun-
terterrorism tactics in general can imply public benefits as country leaders are
seen to possess strength on national security issues that become important for
reelection in the future (Leventoglu and Tarar, 2005).17 Foreign policy choices in
times of international crises have both profound international and domestic con-
sequences for country leaders; affecting transnational alliance networks as well as
voting decisions back home (Smith, 1998). Accordingly, at a minimum, state lead-
15This type of behaviour in international relations is frequently observed at the UN Commission on Human
Rights where governments publically name and shame others for abusing their citizens (Lebovic and Voeten,
2006).
16There are a number of examples in international politics where the U.S. has been successful in persuading
or coercing countries to adopt particular foreign policy positions by leveraging certain rewards and punishments
that skew an actor’s goals and payoffs and make noncooperation a far worse option (Keohane, 1986; Martin,
1992; Fearon, 1998; Katzenstein et al., 1998; Kelley, 2007; Nooruddin and Payton, 2010).
17However, some proactive policies may inevitably provoke terrorist backlash. Thus, governments may seek to
reduce their offensive counterterrorism tactics closer to elections if they can be perceived by the public as costly
(Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004; Marinov et al., 2015).
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ers cooperated in order to maintain their international positions, reputations and
domestic political support through cooperation with the U.S (Levy, 1997). While
at a maximum, states cooperated in an attempt to secure favors from the U.S. that
helped them to achieve goals in national security, governance and international
politics (Sepper, 2010).
3.4 Identifying State Preferences
In order to maintain secrecy and reduce the risk of counterterrorism operations
being exposed, it would have been crucial that the U.S. only approached countries
likely to agree to cooperate in the first place. This selection mechanism can be
conceptualized as a screening process that identified those countries most likely to
perceive the payoffs of cooperation as positive and eliminated those states most
likely to perceive the payoffs of cooperation as negative (Jervis, 1978; Glaser,
1997; Sagan and Waltz, 2003; Asal and Beardsley, 2007). Several studies have
emphasised the importance of perception in decision making within the field of
international security as actor’s decisions can be heavily influenced by the way they
think about their problems (Jervis, 1976; Van Evera, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane,
1985; Downs et al., 1985). The most desirable RDI partners should be those that
view security dilemmas and human rights trade-offs in a similar light to the U.S..
Axelrod and Keohane (1985) argue that we are more likely to observe cooperation
between countries that have mutual interest as the likelihood of both actors being
satisfied with the outcome from negotiations increases. In international politics,
states recognise and develop transnational in-groups by identifying similar states
with shared norms and political culture in order to overcome collective action
problems. Cooperation has a higher rate of success when states have similar aims
as actors become less worried about eliciting reciprocal cooperation from others
and find rewards in cooperating to help others for their own sake (Wendt, 1994;
Lai and Reiter, 2000).
This would have been particularly beneficial during bilateral negotiations as
it reduces the need for expensive rewards to be offered in receipt of cooperation
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as countries would have required less persuasion to join the alliance. For example,
countries with similar security interests that view the imminent threat posed by
Al Qaida in a similar manner may be more willing to agree or comply with ag-
gressive counterterrorism approaches in order to achieve the aims of the network.
Whereas states who emphasise the importance of upholding human rights over
national security at all times would require larger bribes as they would be more
likely to object to the nature of the operations. Countries with closely aligned
preferences and a vested interest in the outcomes of counterterrorism cooperation
make more reliable partners as they are less likely to disclose classified information
that is detrimental to the group (Kydd, 2005). This is an exceptionally impor-
tant consideration given the sensitive nature of RDI cooperation and a desire to
maintain secrecy for as long as possible.
While preferences are difficult to observe directly, they can be analysed at
the level where they manifest; behaviour. The UNGA provides a unique oppor-
tunity to explore the foreign policy positions of every nation in the world within
the same institutional environment (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975; Midlarsky, 1981;
Moon, 1985; Hagan, 1989; Signorino and Ritter, 1999; Gartzke, 2006; Bailey et al.,
2015).18 The UNGA is comprised of all 193 members of the UN who meet in reg-
ular annual sessions to vote on a range of important international security and
peace issues. States at the UNGA are able to observe one another’s voting be-
haviour and derive conclusions about the underlying preferences of their peers
(Bailey et al., 2015). Equally, it also provides an international platform for states
to express their preferences on each topic that a resolution addresses and deliber-
ately signal their type to peers (Hillman and Potrafke, 2012).19
It is largely agreed that the foreign policy position of states (in general) tran-
scends domestic party orientation as UNGA votes remain fairly constant before
and after leadership changes. Moreover, domestic political institutions mediate
18In seeking to explain the formation of state preferences, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that state
behaviour tends to be shaped by those groups in society who ensure a government’s survival in office. Therefore,
in democracies state preferences are more likely to be influenced by the electorate, whereas in autocracies state
behaviour is more likely to represent preferences of elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
19While several studies have demonstrated that UNGA voting with the U.S. is consequential, strategic voting
is noticeably less prevalent compared to other forums such as the UN security council (Wang, 1999; Thacker,
1999; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Vreeland, 2005).
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the level of change in foreign policy as they constrain a leader’s decision mak-
ing process and rarely change across time (Moravscik, 1997; Dreher and Jensen,
2012; Mattes et al., 2015). This is particularly beneficial for analysing interna-
tional cooperation in RDI operations as the type of senior government officials
representing the state and directly engaging in these counterterrorism practices
varied across countries (from intelligence and security personnel to politicians).
Moreover, empirically speaking, many governments changed leadership between
2001-2005 (when RDI operations were most active) and cooperation continued.
However, it is unlikely that all votes matter in this context as there is great
variation in the types of resolutions that states vote on at the UNGA. The category
of votes that are most important in relation to cooperation in the RDI programme
are human rights.20 Voting patterns on this set of resolutions are a representation
of state preferences on human rights that enables states to gather information on
each other’s type and reach conclusions about how they expect certain countries
to behave. There may be many states who agree with the U.S. on security issues
but who fundamentally disagree with the human rights trade-off that must be
made in return. This forum generates data that the U.S. could process when
screening countries according to those states that are more likely to prioritise
national security over human rights in the context of counterterrorism - and agree
to cooperate in RDI. This leads us to the chapter’s central hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Countries with similar human rights preferences to the U.S.
were more likely to cooperate in RDI operations.
While previous research has established that allies have similar preferences,
using alliances as a measure of preferences fails to account for the variation in
preferences specifically on human rights between countries that typically cooper-
ate (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Farber and Gowa, 1997; Smith, 1995; Carnegie,
2015). UNGA voting behaviour on human rights resolutions provide states with
a far more accurate idea of where their peers are ideologically situated on this
20While preferences on other issue areas such as trade or economic development may possibly be correlated
with preferences on human rights, we would not expect these factors to have a major direct impact on U.S.
decision making in this context.
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precise issue. Similarly, analysing the domestic human rights behaviour of states
falls short of capturing preferences on human rights at an international level. This
is especially important given that the RDI programme was transnational in na-
ture (including the nationality of CIA terrorist suspects and the locations where
interrogations took place). Likewise, using ratification records of international
human rights law as a measure of state preferences on human rights is unsuitable
as governments have a multitude of reasons for committing themselves to human
rights treaties. This can result in an asymmetry between ratification patterns and
state behaviour (Hathaway, 2007; Vreeland, 2008; Simmons, 2009; Hollyer and
Rosendorff, 2011; Smith-Cannoy, 2012).
3.5 Research Design
In order to evaluate this chapter’s hypothesis, I estimate a probit model that
tests the effect of U.S. human rights similarity on cooperation in RDI. The unit of
analysis is the country in 2000 and the data used for estimation has information
on 169 states.21
Dependent Variable (Cooperation)
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a state cooperated with the U.S. in RDI
operations at any point after September 11 2001, and 0 otherwise.22 This is
the case for 31% of the observations (53) but not for the remaining 69% (116).
Cooperation is identified by the Open Society Foundations (2013) Globalizing
Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition report, which
provides the most “comprehensive catalog” of detainee transfers and foreign
government participation in RDI practices. The factual content of the report is
derived from carefully reviewed credible public sources and information provided
by reputable human rights organizations (Open Society Foundations, 2013). As
an alternative data source for the dependent variable, I use novel rendition flight
21Using data from 2000 prevents post-9/11 events in the final quarter of 2001 from contaminating the analysis.
22While there are interesting alternatives to this unit of analysis (including the frequency of participation and
category of participation), the current research design focuses solely on what motivated more than a quarter of
the world’s countries from participating in the RDI programme during the post-9/11 period.
51
data that estimates a country’s likelihood of participation using public flight
data and a deterministic model developed by Cordell (2017). This identifies
rendition flights based on the characteristics of confirmed high profile detainee
renditions and estimates binary outcomes for more than 11,000 flights related
to rendition.23 This robustness test shall enable me to evaluate whether this
chapter’s theoretical argument holds according to alternative empirical accounts
of international cooperation in RDI. Results from this different specification of
the probit model are displayed in Appendix 3.1.
Independent Variable (Human Rights Similarity)
To test this chapter’s hypothesis, I use Voeten (2013) UNGA Voting Data to
measure a country’s human rights similarity to the U.S.. I extract data from 2000
on human rights resolutions only.24 Each country observation records whether a
state voted yes, no or abstained on a particular resolution.25 I construct a measure
of U.S. human rights similarity by following Lijphart (1963) formula for Index of
Agreement :
IA =
f + 1
2
g
t
100
Where f equals the number of votes that a country is in full agreement with the
U.S., t equals the total number of votes under consideration, and g equals cases
where one country abstained but the other voted yes or no. For each resolution,
states are coded 1 if they agree with the U.S., 0 if they disagree and .5 if one state
votes yes or no and the other abstains. The index is continuous and has a scale
from 0 to 100. States with higher values (greater similarity) such as the UK have
more similar human rights preferences to the U.S. and states with lower values (less
similarity) such as Lebanon have less similar human rights preferences to the U.S..
23The results suggest 310 likely rendition flights and 15 new participating countries beyond the 54 known cases
including Brazil, Dominican Republic, France, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Qatar,
Senegal, Seychelles, South Korea, Tajikistan, Tunisia.
24All human rights related votes in 2000 were on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
This international legislation is particularly relevant for the type of human rights that this chapter focuses on as
it establishes the standards of humanitarian treatment in war.
25States that were not present at the meeting or are not a member of the UNGA are coded NA.
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There is complete information for the Human Rights Similarity variable for 161
out of 169 countries. The median value is 31.250 (e.g. Nicaragua), the maximum
value is 90.620 (Israel), the minimum value is 3.125 (Equatorial Guinea) and the
standard deviation across the sample is 18.808. The top ten states with the closest
human rights similarity to the U.S. within the sample of countries known to have
cooperated in RDI operations include the UK, Poland, Czech Republic, Germany,
Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Canada, and Denmark.
As an alternative data source for the independent variable, I construct a
second measure of U.S. human rights similarity by following Signorino and Ritter
(1999) formula for S Scores :
1− 2(d)
dmax
Where d equals the sum of metric distances between votes and dmax equals
the largest possible distance for votes. The index is continuous and has a scale
from -1 to +1. Higher values indicate that a country has similar human rights
preferences to the U.S. and lower values indicate that a country has different
human rights preferences to the U.S.. Results from this different specification of
the probit model are displayed in Appendix 3.2.
Controls
To eliminate the possibility that other factors affecting the likelihood of coopera-
tion in RDI operations may be correlated with the preference measure, I control
for a number of confounders.
Flight Path (log)
Extraordinary rendition operations during the post-9/11 period used private civil-
ian aircrafts to conceal detainee transfers. Rendition circuits typically began and
completed their journey in the U.S. (where the home bases of aircrafts were lo-
cated) and included a stop at Washington Dulles International Airport as it pro-
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vided a convenient location to pick up and drop off rendition teams (Shane, 2005).
Due to the limited range of the private civilian aircrafts used by the CIA, extraor-
dinary rendition operations included a series of stops where aircrafts could rest,
refuel and regroup (commonly in Western Europe) during a long journey from
the U.S. to secret detention sites located in Eastern Europe, North Africa and
Asia (Open Society Foundations, 2013). It is possible to analyse all of the flights
within a circuit by using public flight data to track extraordinary rendition flight
paths; including those that facilitate the refuelling of an aircraft before and after
the transfer of a CIA terrorist suspect to a secret detention site (Raphael et al.,
2015).26 Accordingly, we might be more likely to observe cooperation from coun-
tries with an airport closer to the flight path based on their geographical position
and logistical utility during the transfer of a detainee.
I create a Flight Path spatial control variable by calculating the distance of
every airport in the world from the shortest flight path between the U.S. and the
WoT battle ground in Afghanistan. The shortest distance between two points on
the surface of the earth is known as a great circle. I use Geographic Information
System data to model the shortest flight path from Washington Dulles Interna-
tional Airport to Kabul International Airport (a central location for Operation
Enduring Freedom from the end of 2001).27 I calculate the minimum distance
between a state and the flight path using latitude and longitude coordinates from
Our Airports (2016) data. This dataset is the largest publically available dataset
in the field of Aviation; containing geographical information on 39,864 airports
(Our Airports, 2016). I construct a continuous variable and take the natural
logarithm. A high value (e.g. Fiji) represents a greater distance from the flight
path (less logistical utility) and a low value (e.g. Canada) represents a shorter
distance from the flight path (greater logistical utility). Figure 3.2 gives a visual
representation of the flight path control variable. The blue points on the map
26However, in many cases flight data is missing from extraordinary rendition circuits as civil aviation authorities
beyond North America and Europe do not have the same standards for the logging of flight plans or the storing
of data.
27While many other variables inform the “optimum flight path” (defined as the minimumtime route) such as
weather, air traffic, terrain, the safety of fly-zones etc., the current measure provides a simple baseline model that
is still able to capture the theoretical notion of the most convenient extraordinary rendition flight path (Warntz,
1961).
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depict the airport within each country closest to the flight path, and the red line
represents the shortest flight path from Washington Dulles International Airport,
U.S. to Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan.
Figure 3.2: Visual Representation of the Flight Path Control Variable.
The red line represents the shortest flight path from Washington Dulles International Airport, U.S. to Kabul
International Airport, Afghanistan, and the blue points represent the airport within each country closest to the
flight path. Source: Our Airports (2016).
Alliance
I create an Alliance control variable to account for whether or not a state is a
U.S. ally by using Leeds et al. (2002) Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions
data. I construct a dummy variable and code states 1 if they have a formal
military alliance with the U.S. in 2000 (e.g. Australia), and 0 otherwise (e.g.
Switzerland) (Leeds et al., 2002). Following Mattes and Vonnahme (2010),
I exclude non-aggression and neutrality pacts from my analysis as the moti-
vations and obligations behind these agreements are entirely different and do
not require states to actively “cooperate militarily in the face of potential or
realised military conflict” (Leeds and Mattes, 2007; Mattes and Vonnahme, 2010).
Regime Type
I control for Regime Type by using Coppedge et al. (2016) Varieties of Democracy
data. I extract the electoral democracy index; polyarchy and retrieve country
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scores from 2000. This continuous variable captures Dahl (1971)’s conceptual-
ization of polyarchy and includes a country’s respect for freedom of association,
clean elections, freedom of expression, elected executive and suffrage. A higher
value (e.g. Luxembourg) indicates that a state has greater presence of electoral
democracy and a lower value (e.g. Saudi Arabia) indicates that a state has a
lower presence of electoral democracy.
Terrorism (log)
I control for Terrorism threat by using Enders et al. (2011) Domestic Versus
Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics data. This data
separates the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into transnational and domestic
terrorist incidents and calibrates transnational terrorist data from GTD and
ITERATE to overcome the inaccuracies in counting of events (Enders et al.,
2011). Given the international nature of the WoT, I exclude domestic terrorist
incidents from the data and count the number of transnational terrorist incidents
in a given year. I construct a continuous variable and take the natural logarithm
of the total number of transnational terrorist incidents in the ten years preceding
the start of the WoT (1991-2000).28 A higher value (e.g. France) indicates that
a state has a greater terrorism threat and a lower value (e.g. Iceland) indicates
that a state has a lower terrorism threat.
Dependence on the U.S. (Trade%GDP (log), Aid%GDP (log), Population (log))
I control for dependence on the U.S. by using the International Monetary Fund
(IMF (2016)) Direction of Trade Statistics and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) Foreign Aid Explorer dataset. I construct two continuous
variables using data from 2000 that calculate the amount of trade as a percentage
of GDP and the amount of aid as a percentage of GDP using Gleditsch (2002)
Expanded GDP and Trade Data. For the Trade variable, I add a state’s imports
and exports together IMF (2016). For the Aid variable, I add the military
28To account for values of 0 (states that experienced no terrorism attacks) I use the algorithm log(1+x).
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and economic obligations (money agreed to be spent) together (USAID, 2016).
In both instances, I take the natural logarithm of the total.29 A higher value
indicates that a state depends more on the U.S. (e.g. Mexico and Jordan) and a
lower value indicates less dependence (e.g. Cuba and Iran). To further control
for the balance of power with the U.S., I construct a continuous variable that
takes the natural logarithm of a country’s Population size in 2000 using Gleditsch
(2002) Expanded GDP and Trade Data. A higher value indicates that the balance
of power between a state and the U.S. is more equal (e.g. China) and a lower
value indicates that the balance of power between a state and the U.S. is less
equal (e.g. Belize).
Party Orientation
I control for Party Orientation by using the Beck et al. (2015) World Bank
Database of Political Institutions. I extract data for 2000 from the categorical
variable EXECRLC that codes the party orientation of a government as left,
center or right (Beck et al., 2015). I construct a dummy variable for this measure.
States are coded 1 if they are right-wing (e.g. Denmark), and 0 otherwise (e.g.
Norway). These scores specifically relate to a party’s economic policy, but are
likely to be highly correlated with a more general ideological positioning that
applies to other political domains. Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics of this
chapter’s independent and control variables; including the number of observations
(N), mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values.
Method
Given that the dependent variable capturing dyadic cooperation with the U.S. in
RDI is binary, I use a probit model with robust standard errors. I also test the
robustness of the model on a subset of states that are located closer to the flight
path, based on an advantageous geographical position and high logistical utility
during the transfer of a detainee. I interpret countries with a shorter distance to
29To accommodate values for states in receipt of no aid or trade from the U.S., I take the log after adding 1
to the base.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables.
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
Human Rights Similarity 161 36.820 18.808 3.125 90.620
Flight Path (log) 169 7.729 1.327 2.272 9.408
Alliance 169 0.296 0.458 0 1
Regime Type 158 0.527 0.274 0.027 0.941
Terrorism (log) 168 2.110 1.510 0 6.528
Trade%GDP (log) 169 8.266 2.892 0 13.620
Aid%GDP (log) 169 5.113 3.165 0 10.400
Population (log) 169 8.984 1.639 5.523 14.040
Party Orientation 169 0.231 0.423 0 1
the flight path as those below the median value of 8.035 (Venezuela). This reduces
the number of observations from 169 to 85. The distribution of the dependent
variable in this subsample includes 37 countries coded as 1 (that did cooperate),
and 0 otherwise (that did not cooperate).
3.6 Results
The theoretical argument predicts that states with similar human rights prefer-
ences were more likely to cooperate with the U.S. in RDI. The first model in
Table 3.2 presents the baseline effect of human rights similarity on dyadic cooper-
ation with the U.S.. The second model presents the full model including control
variables.
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Table 3.2: Probit Regression, Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation.
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Baseline Model Full Model
Human Rights Similarity Human Rights Similarity
Human Rights Similarity 0.015*** 0.022**
(0.005) (0.010)
Flight Path (log) - -0.127
(0.086)
Alliance - -0.568*
(0.334)
Regime Type - -0.652
(0.736)
Terrorism (log) - 0.074
(0.098)
Trade%GDP (log) - 0.009
(0.047)
Aid%GDP (log) - -0.090**
(0.041)
Population (log) - 0.085
(0.094)
Party Orientation - -0.246
(0.297)
Constant -1.033*** -0.282
(0.235) (1.206)
N 161 149
LR chi2 8.024 26.462
Prob>chi2 0.005 0.002
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.215
Log Likelihood -97.272 -82.507
AIC 198.54 185.01
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
Table 3.3 tests the hypothesis on a subset of states that are located closer to the
flight path, based on an advantageous geographical position and high logistical
utility during the transfer of a detainee. The results from Table 3.2 and Table 3.3
provide empirical support for the hypothesis.
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Table 3.3: Probit Regression, Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation –
Using the Flight Path Subgroup.
Variables Model 3
Flight Path Subgroup
Human Rights Similarity
Human Rights Similarity 0.028**
(0.014)
Flight Path (log) -
Alliance -0.288
(0.419)
Regime Type -1.190
(1.143)
Terrorism (log) 0.135
(0.131)
Trade%GDP (log) 0.048
(0.079)
Aid%GDP (log) -0.105**
(0.051)
Population (log) -0.032
(0.132)
Party Orientation -1.505
(0.395)
Constant -0.383
(1.287)
N 76
LR chi2 12.811
Prob>chi2 0.119
Pseudo R2 0.207
Log Likelihood -46.168
AIC 110.34
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
As expected, countries with greater human rights similarity to the U.S. are
more likely to cooperate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period. This
positive relationship holds in every model and is statistically significant at the
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95% confidence level (or more) throughout. We observe less cooperation from
states with opposing human rights preferences to the U.S. as the U.S. only ap-
proached those countries that it expected to agree to cooperate (states with similar
preferences on human rights-security trade-offs). The perceived likelihood of co-
operation plays an important part in this story as keeping RDI operations secret
was paramount. Human rights preferences can easily be observed by peers at the
UNGA; enabling states to both signal their type and identify countries that are
more likely to view security dilemmas in a similar way. I test the robustness of my
empirical results using alternative data sources for the dependent and independent
variable and the results still hold (see Appendix 3.1 and Appendix 3.2).
The full model (model 2) that includes all the control variables and tests the
effect of Human Rights Similarity using a global sample demonstrates the greatest
model fit. The effect of Human Rights Similarity to the U.S. has a significant and
positive effect on cooperation in RDI at the 95% confidence level. The Alliance
control variable has a significant but negative effect at the 90% confidence level and
the Aid%GDP (log) variable is significant but negative at the 95% confidence level.
These findings indicate that states with less formal alliances and less dependence
on the U.S. were more likely to cooperate; the opposite of what the literature
expects. This finding supports my claim that the secret nature of RDI operations
imposed an entirely different dynamic on alliance formation that required the U.S.
to be far more selective beyond its usual cooperation partners.
Figure 3.3 shows the predicted probability of human rights similarity on coop-
eration in RDI during the post-9/11 period according to model 2. The predicted
probabilities are computed by holding all control variables at their means. The x-
axis displays the range of values for Human Rights Similarity to the U.S. rescaled
between 0 and 1 from 0.0313 (very dissimilar) to 0.906 (very similar). The y-
axis displays the probability of dyadic cooperation with the U.S., ranging from
1 (cooperated) to 0 (did not cooperate). The observed values of human rights
similarity (black points) hug the minimum and maximum range of the plot along
the horizontal axis (with darker points indicating more observations and lighter
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points indicating less observations). The blue solid line represents the predicted
probabilities and the dashed black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3.3: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model 2).
The results show that the probability of dyadic cooperation increases as hu-
man rights similarity increases. When the independent variable is held at its mean
(e.g. South Africa and Thailand), the probability of cooperation in RDI is 31%.
When the independent variable is held at the 95th percentile (e.g. the UK and
Poland), the probability of cooperation in RDI increases to 50%. These empirical
findings support the hypothesis that we are more likely to observe secret security
cooperation in RDI from states with similar human rights preferences to the U.S..
3.7 Model Evaluation
In order to test the robustness of my empirical results and evaluate the model fit, I
compare the expected and observed outcomes of cooperation in RDI between pairs
of countries included in the full model (model 2) using repeated cross validation.30
I run Optimal Non-Bipartite Matching on the sample of complete cases (149 coun-
tries) to identify pairs of countries that have the greatest similarity to one another
on the Flight Path (log), Alliances, Terrorism (log), Trade%GDP (log), Aid%GDP
30Given the odd number of complete cases included in the sample, there is one country that does not receive a
matched pairing: India. This is because the distance to its closest match is the greatest of all observations and
as a result it is discarded from the cross validation analysis.
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(log), Population (log), Party Orientation variables. This method creates a N x N
distance matrix for all potential matches and finds optimal pairs according to the
smallest total sum of distance between two units in the data on all the covariates
(see Appendix 3.3).
I examine the predictive capability of the model by constructing a dummy
variable of expected cooperation that assigns 1 to the country in each pair whose
human rights preferences are most similar to the U.S., and 0 otherwise. The
theoretical argument predicts that states with similar human rights preferences
were more likely to cooperate with the U.S. in RDI. I perform repeated cross
validation that evaluates the accuracy of the predictive model trained on one set
of the data, using a machine-learning algorithm that randomly splits the data into
k-folds and measures accuracy of the model by the mean over samples.
Table 3.4 displays the results of a Naïve Bayes analysis of the model’s pre-
dicted conditional probability of dyadic cooperation with the U.S. using the Open
Society Foundations (2013) data (model 1) and the Cordell (2017) Rendition Flight
Data (model 2). Both models are trained using 10 folds of the training data and
repeated 10 times; computing model accuracy based on the test data not used for
training. The results indicate a model accuracy of 66% using the Open Society
Foundations (2013) data and a model accuracy of 67% using the Cordell (2017)
Rendition Flight Data.
Table 3.4: Estimating Model Accuracy with 10 x Repeated K-fold Cross-validation Using Naïve
Bayes.
Model 1 (Open Society Foundations, 2013)
Kernel density distribution Accuracy
False 0.655
True 0.655
Model 2 (Cordell, 2017)
Kernel density distribution Accuracy
False 0.669
True 0.669
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3.8 Discussion and Conclusion
What influenced more than a quarter of the world’s countries to participate in RDI
operations during the post-9/11 period? Unlike other forms of secret counterter-
rorism cooperation, the practice of extraordinary rendition has the advantage of
being observable (ex-post), as we can analyse detainee testimony and suspected
extraordinary rendition flight paths using publicly available data. Given the sensi-
tive nature of cooperation required, I have argued that the U.S. screened countries
according to their preferences on human rights-security trade-offs. Countries with
similar preferences to the U.S. on human rights were cheaper to buy off and would
have required less persuasion to cooperate as they are more likely to view security
dilemmas and human rights trade-offs in a similar light. In order to obtain support
from the international community during the WoT and maintain counterterror-
ism cooperation, the U.S. needed to ensure that their RDI programme remained
secret. Therefore, it was crucial that the U.S. avoided approaching countries that
it expected would decline cooperation and risk leaking their contentious coun-
terterrorism plans. Cooperation in RDI activities offered participants a mutually
beneficial partnership that was expected to strengthen every member’s national
security. Countries with closely aligned preferences and a vested interest in the
outcomes of counterterrorism cooperation make more reliable partners as they
are less likely to disclose classified information that is detrimental to the group.
To test this hypothesis, I used UNGA voting data to explore similarity in state
preferences on human rights. Results from my quantitative analysis provide ro-
bust empirical support my theoretical argument. This analysis contributes to a
wider discussion in the field of international relations that seeks to understand
the causes and dynamics of clandestine security cooperation.
However, one concern with this chapter’s results that warrants further dis-
cussion is that the relationship between the independent variable, Human Rights
Similarity, and the dependent variable, Cooperation, may be spurious. Specifi-
cally, the U.S.’ need to induce concessions from a given country might explain
both voting behaviour at the UNGA on human rights and whether a country co-
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operates in RDI operations. While this concern is valid, previous literature on
sanctions and strategic voting behaviour have established that a) tactical voting
at the UNGA is noticeably less prevalent compared to other political forums and
that b) not all countries are as likely to targeted by the U.S. and coerced into
behaving in a specific way (Wang, 1999; Thacker, 1999; Alesina and Dollar, 2000;
Vreeland, 2005). When considering human rights behaviour in particular, Kelley
(2007) argues that the U.S. is less likely to try and persaude a country with lib-
eral democratic insitutions to engage in represson because coercion is less likely
to work (since their behaviour is constrained by domestic and international legal
commitments to human rights). Similarly, Nooruddin and Payton (2010) find that
the U.S. is more likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of states that depend
on them for things like trade and aid as the leverage is greater and the sanctions
are more likely to be sucessful. Accordingly, both of these important confounding
variables are controlled for in my empirical model (Regime Type and Trade%GDP,
Aid%GDP and Population (log)) and the results do not suggest that there is there
should be any endogeneity concerns. Moreover, by focusing on UN votes in 2000
(before the start of the WoT) the possibility that the U.S. is using UN votes to
secure RDI cooperation (and vice versa) is eliminated. More generally, I will also
include all votes at the UNGA in 2000 as a control variable in a future version
of this chapter in order to test whether the Human Rights Similarity variable
captures something unique about preference similarity on human rights as this
chapter advocates (as opposed to preference similarity in general).
In addition, I intend to advance this chapter by replacing the current mea-
sure of Human Rights Similarity with an ideal point measure of state preferences
on human rights (such as the dynamic ordinal spatial model developed by Bailey
et al. (2015)). Lijphart (1963) and Signorino and Ritter (1999) alternative S Score
formulas for measuring foreign policy positions are both intutive and easy to in-
terpret and have thus been useful in initially testing whether the empirical results
yield support for my main hypothesis. However, moving forward it is important
to test whether the results hold according to more sophisicated measures of state
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preferences. Beyond the main empirical model, using an ideal point model in-
stead of S Scores will enable additional (and more accurate) robustness tests that
consider the extent to which state preferences on human rights have changed over
time (leading up to the WoT) and enable checks for strategic voting to take place
(Bailey et al., 2015).
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3.9 Appendicies
Appendix 3.1: Probit Regression Using Alternative Data for Dependent Variable – using Cordell
(2017) rendition flight data.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Baseline Model Full Model Flight Path Subgroup
Human Rights Similar-
ity
Human Rights Similar-
ity
Human Rights Similar-
ity
Human Rights Similar-
ity
0.014** 0.017* 0.022
(0.005) (0.010) (0.014)
Flight Path (log) - -0.190** -
(0.088)
Alliance - 0.219 0.561
(0.327) (0.413)
Regime Type - -0.513 -1.400
(0.744) (1.160)
Terrorism (log) - 0.123 0.159
(0.099) (0.130)
Trade%GDP (log) - -0.053 -0.044
(0.047) (0.078)
Aid%GDP (log) - -0.047 -0.024
(0.041) (0.136)
Population (log) - 0.076 -0.106
(0.10) (0.135)
Party Orientation - -0.510* -0.660*
(0.304) (0.396)
Constant -0.986*** 0.359 0.636
(0.234) (1.227) (1.310)
N 161 149 76
LR chi2 6.659 27.222 10.253
Prob>chi2 0.001 0.001 0.248
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.232 0.190
Log Likelihood -97.955 -80.761 -47.316
AIC 199.91 181.52 112.63
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Appendix 3.2: Probit Regression Using Alternative Data for Independent Variable – Using
(Signorino and Ritter, 1999) Rendition Flight Data.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Baseline Model Full Model Flight Path Subgroup
Human Rights Similar-
ity
Human Rights Similar-
ity
Human Rights Similar-
ity
Human Rights Similar-
ity
0.670** 0.709* 0.981**
(0.272) (0.391) (0.497)
Flight Path (log) - -0.117 -
(0.091)
Alliance - -0.602* -0.379
(0.333) (0.417)
Regime Type - -0.036 -0.381
(0.609) (0.877)
Terrorism (log) - 0.016 0.103
(0.098) (0.128)
Trade%GDP (log) - 0.016 0.090
(0.047) (0.085)
Aid%GDP (log) - -0.102** -0.111**
(0.041) (0.051)
Population (log) - 0.088 -0.012
(0.096) (0.132)
Party Orientation - -0.209 -0.434
(0.293) (0.395)
Constant 0.384*** 0.224 -0.035
(0.108) (1.146) (1.243)
N 161 149 76
LR chi2 6.260 24.604 12.589
Prob>chi2 0.012 0.003 0.127
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.206 0.205
Log Likelihood -98.154 -83.436 -46.278
AIC 200.31 186.87 110.56
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Appendix 3.3: Results from Optimal Non-Bipartite Matching.
Greater U.S. Human Rights Similarity Lesser U.S. Human Rights Similarity
Afghanistan Tajikistan
Albania Moldova
Algeria Sri Lanka
Armenia Macedonia
Australia Japan
Barbados Suriname
Belarus Azerbaijan
Bhutan Swaziland
Brazil Argentina
Bulgaria Romania
Burkina Faso Botswana
Canada Denmark
Chad Cameroon
Chile Greece
Colombia Peru
Comoros Qatar
Congo Angola
Croatia Israel
Cyprus Austria
Democratic Republic of the Congo Nigeria
Djibouti Solomon Islands
Dominican Republic Hungary
Egypt Ethiopia
El Salvador Honduras
Estonia Latvia
Finland Sweden
France United Kingdom
Gabon Malaysia
Ghana Mongolia
Guyana Trinidad and Tobago
Haiti Jamaica
Indonesia Bangladesh
Iran China
Ireland New Zealand
Italy Netherlands
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Ivory Coast South Africa
Jordan Georgia
Lebanon Bosnia and Herzegovina
Libya Yugoslavia
Madagascar Guinea
Malawi Paraguay
Maldives Fiji
Mauritania Gambia
Mauritius Slovenia
Morocco Zimbabwe
Namibia Lesotho
Nepal Ukraine
Nicaragua Guatemala
North Korea Eritrea
Norway Iceland
Pakistan Russia
Panama Bolivia
Papua New Guinea Thailand
Philippines Ecuador
Poland Czech Republic
Senegal Benin
Sierra Leone Rwanda
Slovakia Lithuania
South Korea Portugal
Spain Belgium
Sudan Cuba
Syria Saudi Arabia
Tanzania Kenya
Togo Burundi
Tunisia Laos
Turkey Germany
Turkmenistan Kyrgyzstan
Uganda Mozambique
Uruguay Costa Rica
Uzbekistan Kazakhstan
Venezuela Mexico
Vietnam Myanmar
Yemen Cambodia
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Zambia Mali
Pairs are matched according to the total similarity on the following control variables; Flight Path (log),
Alliances, Terrorism (log), Trade%GDP (log), Aid%GDP (log), Population (log), Party Orientation.
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4 The Political Costs of International Cooperation in Ex-
traordinary Rendition
4.1 Abstract
We now know that more than a quarter of all countries in the world cooperated
in a secret rendition network that enabled the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects
to secret detention sites after the launch of the WoT in 2001. While governments
and leaders in some states have not been punished for participating, others have
incurred several political costs, including electoral defeats. What explains the
variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 RDI programme?
I argue that left of centre governments suffered greater political costs from being
caught because of the perception that they should be more concerned about pro-
tecting civil liberties in the context of national security. This theory is consistent
with the existing claim that political scandals that reveal greater differences in a
party’s public and private type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters
to question their credibility as a government. I test the effect of party orientation
on electoral defeat at the election following the revelation of cooperation in ex-
traordinary rendition using a sample of all democracies where the party in office at
the time of cooperation remained the same. The analysis provides some empirical
support for my theoretical argument.
4.2 Introduction
At the end 2005 it emerged that several European countries had been helping
the U.S. to run a post-9/11 global rendition network that enabled the transfer
of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the world (Amnesty In-
ternational, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2005; Priest, 2005a,b; Ross, 2005). In
response, the Council of Europe and European Parliament established commit-
tees to investigate “alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of
detainees involving Council of Europe member states” (Council of Europe, 2006b;
European Parliament, 2006b). From June 2006, the commissions released a se-
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ries of investigative reports that relied upon detainee testimony, expert witness
accounts and suspected extraordinary rendition flight data; and pointed to the
participation of more than 60 states (in Europe and elsewhere).31 They described
how foreign governments had assisted with the arrests, detention and interroga-
tion of CIA terrorist suspects and enabled extraordinary rendition aircrafts to fly
in their airspace and land discretely at their airports (Council of Europe, 2006b;
European Parliament, 2006b). The reports elicited mainstream media coverage,
public debates and condemnation from the international community (Bonini, 2006;
Cameron, 2006; Kirk, 2006).32 While some governments have not been punished
for participating, others have incurred several political costs including a loss in
votes, a decline in public opinion, and the ability to hold office at the election
following the revelation of cooperation in rendition (of Human Rights, 2016).33
What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in post-9/11
CIA extraordinary RDI operations?
I argue that states with left of centre governments suffered greater political
costs from being caught because of the perception that they are better at protect-
ing civil liberties in the context of national security (Welch and Schuster, 2005;
Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014).34 Liberal voters are less likely to consider
trading off civil liberties in the name of national security and would be more likely
to perceive the revelation that their government was complicit in the violation of
human rights as a grievance (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver, 2003).
Consequently, left of centre parties are more likely to be hurt by a contentious se-
curity scandal as liberal voters disillusioned by the government’s behaviour could
31Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, UK, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zambia.
32See here for examples: a) http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/ciagate2/rapporto-
marty/rapporto-marty.html b) http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/council-of-europe-cia-used-prague-
airport-for-refuelling-secret-flights c) https://euobserver.com/foreign/21855.
33Several governments have also suffered financially through schemes that compensate survivors of torture and
fund government and parliamentary inquiries into their alleged complicity.
34It is certainly evident that left-wing governments are not de facto liberal in practice. For example, throughout
history left-wing totalitarian governments have committed mass atrocities and under the presidency of Barack
Obama, the Democrats deported more people than any other government (Mitchell and McCormick, 2011;
Marshall, 2016). However, in the context that this chapter focuses on, it is the perception among voters that left
of centre governments are more liberal that their right of centre counterparts that counts.
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respond by voting for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer
aligned to their own (Downs, 1957; Davis et al., 1970; Jessee, 2009). Alterna-
tively, this event could foster a distrust in politicians and democratic institutions
among left of centre voters that leads to a decline in political engagement and
withdrawal from voting altogether (Downs, 1957; Converse, 1966; Citrin et al.,
1975; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004). A scandal that causes a deterioration in a
party’s social respectability can also alienate swing voters and cause the median
voter to opt for a more viable and reputable alternative (Hibbing and Welch, 1997;
Green et al., 2002). This theory is consistent with the existing claim that polit-
ical scandals that reveal greater differences in a party’s public and private type
threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility as
a government (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Tomz, 2007).
To test my hypothesis, I interact data on party orientation (Hyde and Mari-
nov, 2012) with a variable that codes whether a country was described as coop-
erating in the RDI programme by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European
Parliament (2006b) reports. The results from the empirical analysis indicate some
support for my theoretical argument. This chapter makes a substantive contri-
bution to the field of international relations by exploring the factors that make
cooperation in contentious security operations costlier for states.
4.3 Political Survival
Political survival literature has identified several areas where challenges to tenure
in office can originate. These explanations can broadly be divided into internal
forces (e.g. domestic policy failures) and external forces (e.g. military defeat
following an inter-state war) (Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011). However, even
when the domestic conditions for surviving in office seem positive, an exogenous
event can unexpectedly take place that disrupts a stable political environment
and threaten the tenure of a politician or government. Examples of these “criti-
cal events” include scandals, prime ministerial deaths, contentious policy issues,
party fractionalisation, intragovernmental disagreements, and crises relating to
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the economy, war and international relations (Browne et al., 1984, 1986). Exoge-
nous events (such as a political scandal) provide a unique opportunity to study
the processes within an internal political system that determine whether a leader
or government is likely to survive in office. In order to understand how exoge-
nous events threaten durability in office, it is important to consider the domestic
processes that they can interact with.
For example, one of the primary reasons why an exogenous event (such as
a global economic crisis) can have such an adverse effect on political survival is
because resources are integral to sustaining political support (Bueno de Mesquita
et al., 1999). In a democracy where the size of the group in society with the ability
to choose the leadership that governs the country is large (the selectorate) and
the size of the group in society whose support determines whether the leadership
can remain in office is also large (the winning coalition), the provision of public
goods is of central importance. Whereas, in an autocracy, where the selectorate
is large but the winning coalition is small, the distribution of private goods to a
limited number of peers is a greater determinant for political survival (Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2009). More generally, in a democracy if the government
fails to provide adequate levels of public goods such as the rule of law, low tax
rates, national security, education and human rights, then their supporters can
defect to a rivalling party that promises better policy provisions. For governments
operating in presidential systems, a decline in the allocation of public goods is even
more critical since the group of people that compose the winning coalition is far
larger than in parliamentary systems (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
On the other hand, an exogenous event (such as a political scandal) can
threaten the survival of a political leader or government because it often implies
that they are incompetent. The degree to which a leader is seen to be competent
and have the ability to run the government effectively (in comparison to the
perceived competence of the opposition leader) strongly influences voter decisions
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). At the beginning of a leader’s time in office they
are particularly vulnerable to being removed from office but over time as they gain
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experience, this hazard rate decreases (Chan and Scarritt, 2003). However, this
relationship is not linear as long periods of governance can result in the public
developing a fatigue with the current leader and a desire for a new replacement
(Bienen and Van De Walle, 1991).
More generally, minority governments are considered to be more vulnerable
to turnover in office (particularly in parliamentary systems) than their majoritar-
ian counterparts as they have greater difficulty implementing their chosen policies.
As a consequence, they are seen to perform worse in office (Johnson, 1975; Pow-
ell, 1982; Strøm, 1985). Along similar lines, the concentration and influence of
the ideological opposition (on a left-right scale relative to the incumbent’s party)
can also determine the expected duration of a government; with greater numbers
making it easier to form a legislative coalition that can defeat the ruling party
(King et al., 1990). Strøm (1984) and Goemans et al. (2009) also find that the
way a government enters office can affect the policy decisions that they make as
well as determine the fate of their exit. For example, leaders who enter office in
an irregular manner (e.g. following mass popular protests or a coup d’état) are
more likely to pursue risky and opportunistic policies as well as exit office in an
irregular manner (Goemans et al., 2009).35 Similarly, coalitions struggle to hold
onto office because their formation typically follows an unexpected electoral out-
come in an unstable fractionalised environment (Strøm, 1984; Laver and Schofield,
1990). Therefore, we might expect an exogenous event to have more of a debili-
tating effect on survival in office for political leaders and governments operating in
these contexts as they are more vulnerable to being perceived by their selectorate
and/or winning coalition as incompetent in the first place.
While the cause of a critical event can often be traced back to the actions of
individuals within the government, the timing of their exposure is largely out of
the hands of those at the centre of the allegations (Browne et al., 1986). These
events can be fatal for politicians and cabinets. However, their timing, magnitude
and intensity can have disproportional effects (Browne et al., 1984). For example,
35Although this relationship weakens over time.
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if an event takes place close to an election, we should expect the impact to be
more severe than events that take place in the middle of an election cycle as
they are more likely to be forgotten over time (Diermeier and Stevensen, 1999).
A government’s initial response can also counter some of the negative effects of
an external event; such as firing the individual(s) associated with the scandal or
calling for their resignation (Dewan and Myatt, 2007).
One type of exogenous event that can threaten duration in office is the rev-
elation that the government has committed human rights abuses. Although the
domestic costs associated with violating the rights of individuals are more likely
to affect democracies than autocracies. Countries with liberal democratic institu-
tions provide the opportunity for citizens to respond to moral and legal concerns
regarding contentious government behaviour (e.g. protests) and threaten the gov-
ernment for violating human rights (e.g. removal via ballot) (Davenport et al.,
2008). Specifically, the cost of using repression in liberal democracies is greater
because of “voice” (a competitive and fair electoral system that incentivises leaders
to behave according to public opinion), “veto” (constraints on executive authority
and a dispersion of power) and the legal guarantee of free speech/freedom of ex-
pression (that allow journalists and civil society to track, criticise and challenge
the behaviour of state officials) (Van Belle, 2000; Davenport, 2007; Davenport
et al., 2008).
An example that demonstrates the political costs for a democracy that en-
gages in serious human rights violations are the events that followed the release
of photographs documenting abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by the U.S.
military. Polls indicated widespread disapproval regarding the mistreatment of
detainees and the overall performance rating of former U.S. President, George W.
Bush, fell to the lowest in his presidency (Drash, 2009). Accordingly, we should
not expect a scandal of this kind to pose a meaningful threat to non-democratic
regimes where human rights abuses are more commonplace. When a political
scandal like this ocurs, the institutions that enable “the people” to punish lead-
ers are usually absent and it is elites (not the public) who hold the power when
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choosing whether to make a challenge to the leadership (Downs and Rocke, 1994).
4.4 Foreign Complicity in Rendition
I frame the revelation that states cooperated in RDI operations uncovered by the
Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) committees as an
exogenous shock to domestic voting conditions.36 Government officials were not
responsible for exposing this political scandal and could do very little to prevent
the information from reaching the electorate (Maurer, 2011).37 States would have
been aware of the domestic and international costs associated with these activities;
from perpetuating grievances (that can lead to an increase in terrorism threat) to
triggering negative public opinion among the electorate, and gaining a disingen-
uous reputation that could hinder international relations (Guisinger and Smith,
2002; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Satori, 2005; Wike, 2016). Whilst these costs
are all worth consideration, for the purposes of this chapter, I focus on the ulti-
mate cost of being caught for participation in rendition; losing office.38 Figure 4.1
demonstrates the disproportionate effect of this revelation among those democ-
racies that allegedly cooperated where the party in office during the period that
extraordinary rendition operations took place (2001-2005) was the same party in
office at the election that followed the revelation in 2006 (excluding Cyprus and
Japan). This context provides an ideal opportunity to analyse the causes and
dynamics of the political costs associated with contentious security cooperation.
The details that emerged from the Council of Europe (2006b) and European
Parliament (2006b) reports on the extraordinary rendition and secret detention of
CIA terrorist suspects generated a great deal of attention both domestically and
internationally for those countries allegedly involved. To take one example, the
36It is important to note that while the revelation of participation in RDI operations may be exogenous, RDI
cooperation certainly is not as the U.S. selects which countries to approach for cooperation and in turn countries
select into the RDI network by deciding whether or not to participate (as the previous chapter argues). However,
we should not expect this feature to bias results as I test whether the main explanatory variable in this chapter
(Party Orientation) is a significant predictor of RDI cooperation in chapter 3 (included as a control variable in
the empirical model) and find that it is not. In relation to endogeneity concerns regarding the dependent variable
in this chapter (Electoral Defeat), the findings from chapter 3 also confirm that Regime Type is not a signficiant
predictor of cooperation in RDI (which is promising given the possibility that democracies are more likely to
incur political costs from participating).
37Excluding the possibility of whistleblowers.
38While there are conceivably worse costs than removal from office (e.g. assassination or execution), there
is no evidence that a leader or government incurred this post-exit fate as a result of participating in rendition
(Goemans et al., 2009)
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Figure 4.1: Ability of Party to Hold Office Following Revelation of Cooperation in 2006.
Ability of party to hold office, with parties in red countries failing to secure re-election and parties in yellow
countries succeeding, and white for countries not identified by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European
Parliament (2006b) reports. Source: Hyde and Marinov (2012)
European intergovernmental committees concluded in their reports that the UK
was directly responsible for violating the rights of three detainees (and indirectly
responsible for allowing “stopovers” for flights involving the unlawful transfer of
many more) (Council of Europe, 2006a; European Parliament, 2006a). One of
these detainees, Jamil El-Banna, stated:
“My interrogator asked me ‘Why are you so angry at America? It is your
Government, Britain, the MI5, who called the CIA and told them that
you and Bisher were in the Gambia and to come and get you. Britain
gave everything to us. Britain sold you out to the CIA’”
(Council of Europe, 2006a).
In response to growing domestic pressure and calls for the UK to investigate its
alleged collusion in post-9/11 RDI operations, the UK parliament established two
major inquiries headed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and The All
Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition. The committees anal-
ysed detainee testimony, government and security service telegrams, extraordinary
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rendition flight paths and interviewed several UK government officials including
Ministers, Members of Parliament and Ambassadors (Joint Committee on Human
Rights, 2006; Gough et al., 2011). Beyond these dedicated forums, there have
been over 200 spoken references on “rendition” in the UK House of Commons and
House of Lords and three exclusive debates since it was discovered that the UK was
complicit in these secret counterterrorism operations (UK Parliament, 2017a,b).
These revelations both provided ammunition to opposition parties in the UK (e.g.
the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats party) and caused rifts within
the Labour party and other government departments during the election period
that followed the release of the reports (2006-2010) (Carey, 2008; Hague, 2009;
Clegg, 2010; Hopkins and Norton-Taylor, 2016).39 During this time, several public
opinion polls on the British public revealed that the majority of people rejected
torture and supported the “unequivocal rule against torture, even in the case of
terrorists who have information that could save innocent lives” (Opinion, 2006,
2008). Together, investigative reports and media spotlight on foreign complicity
in torture during the post-9/11 period have “driven public opinion in Europe on
the issue of rendition” (Benjamin, 2007).
However, not every leader and government that was caught cooperating in
rendition has been punished for participating. What explains the variation in the
political costs of participation in the post-9/11 RDI programme? I argue that
states with left of centre governments were hurt more by the revelation of foreign
complicity in RDI operations because of the perception that they are better at
protecting civil liberties in the context of national security (Welch and Schuster,
2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014). Previous research has demonstrated
strong ideological differences between liberal and conservative voters regarding the
importance of protecting civil liberties versus maintaining social order. Liberal
voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties than conservative voters
and accordingly would be more likely to perceive the revelation that their govern-
39See here for examples: a) http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2008/02/diego-garcia-british-foreign b)
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1161081/WILLIAM-HAGUE-We-let-judge-probe-torture-case.html
c) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7099169/The-US-is-our-ally-but-we-arent-
its-servant.html d) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/may/31/revealed-britain-rendition-policy-rift-
between-spy-agencies-mi6-mi5.
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ment was complicit in the violation of human rights as a grievance (McClosky and
Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver, 2003). The consequences of a voter discovering that
the party they are affiliated with no longer shares the same interests on security
and human rights trade-offs are two-fold.
First, this event could generate disillusion among liberal voters and drive
them to vote for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned
to their own (Downs, 1957; Davis et al., 1970; Jessee, 2009). For example, UK
Actor, Colin Firth, described how he was voting for the Liberal Democrats at the
election that followed the revelation that the Labour Party had engaged in rendi-
tion because of their policies on asylum seekers, Iraq, rendition and Guantánamo
Bay (Hope, 2010). Similarly, the number of votes that the left wing Democratic
Party in Cyprus received in the 2008 elections that followed the discovery that
they participated in rendition dropped dramatically from 51.5% (at the previous
election) to 31.79%. The party that replaced them was a left of centre party; the
Progressive Party of the Working People (International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, 2017). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) explore the issue of conflicting
attitudes on policy decisions between voters and the government in their analysis
of threats to political survival and argue that the domestic backers of parties must
be satisfied in order to prevent them from defecting to a challenger.
Second, this event could foster distrust in politicians and democratic institu-
tions among left of centre voters and plausibly lead to a decline in political en-
gagement and a withdrawal from voting altogether (Downs, 1957; Converse, 1966;
Citrin et al., 1975; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004; Trubowitz and Mellow, 2005).
For example, UK Actor, Julie Walters, stated that she was not going to vote for
any party in the 2010 election that followed the revelation that the UK cooper-
ated in rendition. This was a direct result of feeling “disillusioned and let down”
by the Labour party in general that she perceived consisted of “slippery, evasive,
irresponsible liars” (particularly in relation to their dishonest foreign policy be-
haviour) (Todd, 2010). Similarly, at the 2008 elections in Cyprus that followed
the revelation that the left wing Democratic Party had participated in rendition,
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voter turnout was down from 91.75% (at the previous election) to 89.62% (Inter-
national Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2017). In addition to preventing the
party from securing re-election, these steps can also be pursued by voters to send
a signal to future leaders regarding their tolerance and preferences on such issues
and deter the party from behaving in a similar manner in the future (Downs and
Rocke, 1994).
A scandal that causes a deterioration in a party’s social respectability can
also alienate swing voters and cause the median voter to opt for a more viable
and reputable alternative (Hibbing and Welch, 1997; Green et al., 2002). While
the public is aware that effective diplomacy requires secrecy and freedom from
democratic constraints, principle agent theory explains how the principal (elec-
torate or elites) are motivated to punish agents (politicians) when their actions
are discovered to be at odds with the commitments made to the public at the
beginning of the contract (previous election) (Holmstrom, 1979; Rasmusen, 2001;
Baum and Potter, 2008; Lane, 2013; Colaresi, 2014). Political scandals that reveal
greater differences in a party’s public and private type threaten their survival in
office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government (Guisinger
and Smith, 2002; Tomz, 2007). Experimental research has shown that the public
dislikes a political leader that behaves in an inconsistent manner, with contradic-
tory statements from an incumbent resulting in widespread disapproval among
the population (Tomz, 2007).
Such events can also generate negative consequences at the international level
that interact with voting decisions back home. Guisinger and Smith (2002) ar-
gue that voters have an incentive to punish agents who behave dishonestly as
their behaviour over time will lack credibility and possibly threaten a country’s
national security. When a state is repeatedly observed as behaving inconsistently
(in private and in public) they are more likely to gain a damaging reputation inter-
nationally for lying that could prevent future cooperation between states (Satori,
2005). Trust is paramount to international cooperation, otherwise countries will
fail to collaborate and opponents will question whether a country’s threat is cred-
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ible (Smith, 1998; McGilivray and Smith, 2000; Satori, 2002). Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003) argue that citizens care about how their state fares in international
politics (both for material and policy reasons) which can motivate voters to remove
parties from office and replace them with parties whose international credibility
appears to be intact (Croco, 2011). This discussion leads to the chapter’s central
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The political costs of participation in post-9/11 RDI operations
were greater for left of centre parties relative to parties ideologically to the
right
It also follows from this argument that centrist parties should experience
greater political costs for cooperating in rendition relative to right of centre par-
ties (though they should be less severe in comparison to the political costs that
left of centre parties incurr). Previous research on centrist voter ideology demon-
strates that the median voter prefers a more moderate approach to governance.
However, the revelation that a centrist party engaged in the violation of human
rights suggests that they are ideologically positioned further to the right than
expected (Downs, 1957; Aspinwall, 2002; Green, 2007; Treier and Hillygus, 2009).
Thus, this exogenous event could also have a negative impact on domestic voting
conditions as it can both reveal a conflict between voter and party preferences
on civil liberties in the context of national security and expose an inconsistency
between a government’s private and public stance on these issues. However, we
should expect the political costs to be worse for parties where the distance between
their private and public type is greater (i.e. left of centre parties).
Another extension of the main hypothesis is that the political benefits of par-
ticipating in the RDI programme were greater for right of centre parties. Conser-
vative voters are more likely to prioritise national security over human rights and
perceive the pursuit of tough counterterrorism measures as a positive demonstra-
tion of strength on this issue (Berrebi and Klor, 2006; Getmansky and Zeitzoff,
2014). Accordingly, right of centre governments that participated in rendition
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should be more likely to be re-elected because it showed conservative and swing
voters that they are competent at combatting terrorism – which is a particularly
salient issue during election periods.
Alternatively, one might expect left of centre parties to benefit from the
discovery that they cooperated in aggressive counterterrorism action and pick up
votes from voters ideologically to the right of them. Left of centre governments
are traditionally perceived to be more “dovish” on counterterrorism which can
be viewed by some voters as a weakness and a prime reason not to vote for
them (Names, 2017). By demonstrating that they are willing to adopt offensive
measures against terrorism, left of centre parties could increase their attractiveness
to both right of centre and swing voters who prefer harsher counterterrorism
approaches. The provision of counterterrorism is a type of public good and the
revelation that a state cooperated in RDI operations signals to voters that they are
competent at responding to terrorist threat (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007). However
compelling this alternative explanation may be, I expect the effects from a party’s
traditional voter base to be stronger than those generated by swing voters and the
opposition party’s traditional voter base. Therefore, left of centre parties should
overall experience greater political costs for participating in rendition relative to
right of centre parties.
The decision to focus on the incumbent’s political party as the unit of anal-
ysis instead of the political leader is driven by the fact that the type of senior
government officials that directly engaged in these counterterrorism practices var-
ied across countries. In many countries it was not just the Chief Executive that
was perceived to be culpable. For example, in the case of the UK two of Labour’s
Former Foreign Secretaries, Jack Straw and David Miliband, and Former Home
Secretary, Alan Johnson, were accused of being complicit in RDI activities (Sed-
don, 2010). Croco (2011)’s work on culpability and domestic punishment explains
how citizens not only blame political leaders for foreign policy failures but also
consider members of the same party responsible if they had close proximity to
the decision-making process (making it more likely that they were involved too).
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Therefore, I would expect the revelation that Tony Blair’s Labour government
participated in the RDI programme to have a negative effect on the party’s rep-
utation in general (and reduce their chances of survival in office) that did not
disappear following the Prime Minister’s resignation. While cabinet changes can
be made by governments to regulate the negative effect of a scandal, the major-
ity of governments denied participating in rendition in order to avoid incurring
political costs. Therefore, most individuals allegedly responsible for cooperating
were not removed from their positions as this action would imply that they know-
ingly cooperated (Dewan and Myatt, 2007). These factors, together with a lack
of transparency on the government’s knowledge of the RDI programme, created
a general impression that cooperation in rendition was a wider party issue (and
not just the result of one or two corrupt individuals).
The culpability issue is also the reason why the sample used for estimation
only includes those democracies where the party in office at the time of the al-
leged cooperation (2001-2005) was the same party in office at the election that
followed the revelation of cooperation in 2006. It does not follow from the theory
outlined in this chapter that we should expect to see governments incur political
costs for cooperation in a clandestine security scandal that they themselves did
not participate in. Thus, it would be misleading to include these parties in the
analysis.
4.5 Research Design
In order to evaluate this chapters hypothesis, I estimate a probit model that tests
the effect of party orientation on electoral defeat. For the independent variable,
I interact party orientation with cooperation in post-9/11 RDI operations (as
identified by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b)
reports). The unit of analysis is the incumbent’s political party in the year that
the election took place following the revelation of cooperation in the RDI pro-
gramme in 2006. The data used for estimation has information on 60 democracies
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where the party in office at the time of cooperation remained the same.40 In
an ideal setting, the sample size would be much bigger. However, as an event
study that seeks to measure the impact of an exogenous event on domestic voting
conditions, the data has been shaped by the empirical realities of cooperation in
rendition and previous theoretical work that suggests the environments where we
are most likely to see the effects.
Dependent Variable (Electoral Defeat)
The dependent variable captures Electoral Defeat. I use Hyde and Marinov (2012)
National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) 4.0 data and ex-
tract the variable NELDA 24 that measures whether the incumbent’s party won
during the national election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI
programme in 2006.41 Table 4.1 displays the distribution of elections by year. I
construct a dummy variable for this measure. Parties are coded 1 if the party
associated with the incumbent lost, and 0 otherwise.42 This is the case for 38%
of the observations (23), but not for the remaining 62% (37).
Table 4.1: Distribution of Elections that Followed the Revelation of Cooperation (by Year).
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Elections 2 17 12 17 7 4 1
As an alternative data source for the dependent variable I construct a
measure of Vote Loss (log) to indicate the extent to which a party’s vote share
declined at the national election that followed the revelation of cooperation in
the RDI programme. I use Kauffman and Kraay (2015) Worldwide Governance
Indicators Project data and extract the numvote variable that records the
40I use ? Modified Polity 4 and P4D Data, Version 4.0 to create a sample of all democracies. I subset those
countries with Polity scores between 6-10 (democracy to full democracy) which results in an N of 102 countries.
I then use Beck et al. (2015) Database of Political Institutions and extract the EXECME (party name) to create
a sub-sample of all democracies where the party in office at the time of the alleged cooperation (2001-2005) is
the same in office at the election that followed the revelation of cooperation in 2006. This results in a final N of
66.
41For many countries there is data for executive, parliamentary/legislative, and constituent assembly elections.
I recode the data as follows: First, I combine same-day legislative and executive elections. Second, I separate
executive and only count parliamentary/legislative and constituent assembly elections when the political system
is something other than presidential. Finally, when there are multiple rounds of elections, I only count the result
from the final round.
42There is complete information on this variable for 60 countries (this excludes Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta from the sample because of their population size).
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percentage of vote share that the incumbent’s party received at an election.43 I
create a continuous variable by subtracting party vote share at the election that
preceded the revelation in 2006 from party vote share at the election that followed
the revelation and then take the natural logarithm.44 A higher value indicates
a greater loss in votes and a lower value indicates a lower loss in votes. If my
theoretical argument is correct, then I would expect to observe a greater decline
the number of votes for left of centre governments that were caught cooperating
in rendition relative to parties ideologically to the right. The results from this
linear model are displayed Appendix 4.1.
Independent Variable (Revelation*Party Orientation)
To test my hypothesis, I interact data on party orientation (Hyde and Marinov,
2012) with a variable that codes whether a country was described as cooperating
in RDI operations by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament
(2006b) reports. I construct a dummy variable that measures whether a country
that was suspected of engaging with the U.S. had a left of centre party in office or
not. Parties are coded 1 if there were details of the country allegedly participating
in the reports and the party in office was were left of centre (e.g. Cyprus), and
0 otherwise (e.g. Greece). This is the case for 8% of the observations (5), but
not for the remaining 92% (61). In an ideal setting the distribution of values for
the independent variable would be more balanced. However, this is the empirical
reality of international cooperation on rendition and nevertheless presents us with
an interesting puzzle worth pursuing. If anything, it would be more remarkable
to find significant support for the main hypothesis given the small number of
observations in the sample.
Revelation
43There is no information on vote share for Montenegro and Serbia in the data. Therefore, I have used the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems ElectionGuide to fill in the missing data and calculate the change
in vote share.
44To account for values of 0 (parties that did not lose any votes) I take the log after adding 1 to the base, i.e.
log(1+x).
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For the first component of the interaction term, I construct a dummy variable that
measures whether a country was described as cooperating in the RDI programme
by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports.45
Parties are coded 1 if the country was named in the reports (e.g. Portugal), and
0 otherwise (e.g. Mexico). This is the case for 32% of the observations (21), but
not for the remaining 68% (45).
Party Orientation
For the second element of the interaction term, I use data from Beck et al. (2015)
Database of Political Institutions as a measure of party orientation. I extract
data from 2006 (the year that the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Par-
liament (2006b) reports were released documenting foreign complicity in the RDI
programme) from the categorical variable EXECRLC that codes the party orien-
tation of a government as left, centre or right (Beck et al., 2015). I construct a
dummy variable for this measure. Parties are coded 1 if they are left of centre
(e.g. the United Kingdom (UK)), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Ireland). This is the case
for 30% of the observations (20), but not for the remaining 70% (46). These scores
specifically relate to a party’s economic policy, but are likely to be highly corre-
lated with a more general ideological positioning that applies to other political
domains.
In order to overcome the empirical challenges associated with the small
number of observations in the sample and specifically the uneven distribution
of binary values on the independent variable Revelation*Party Orientation, I
construct an alternative version of Party Orientation that collapses left of centre
parties and centrist parties (using the same Beck et al. (2015) data). For the
interaction term, parties are coded 1 if there were details of the party allegedly
participating in the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b)
reports and they were left of centre or centrist, and 0 otherwise. This is the
45For the purposes of this analysis, I look at the effects of being caught for cooperation in rendition regardless of
the type and intensity of cooperation. Avenues for future research include disaggregating categories of cooperation
and frequency of cooperation to see whether the revelation was costlier for those countries perceived to be more
culpable.
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case for 20% of the observations (13), but not for the remaining 80% (53). The
theory outlined in this chapter predicts that the political costs of participation
in post-9/11 RDI operations should be greater for left of centre parties relative
to parties ideologically to the right. More generally, this argument implies that
a party caught cooperating in rendition that is ideologically to the left of a right
of centre party should always be worse off (in comparison). If my theoretical
argument is correct, then I would expect both left of centre and centrist parties
in the sample to be more likely to lose following the revelation of cooperating in
rendition. While the method of pooling left of centre and centrist parties together
is certainly not an ideal way to test the chapter’s main hypothesis, it nevertheless
presents us with an opportunity to overcome the limitations of the data and test
whether the results are consistent with the core theoretical argument. Appendix
4.2 displays the differences in coding for the two versions of the Party Orientation
variable.
Controls
To eliminate the possibility that other factors affecting the likelihood of Electoral
Defeat may be correlated with the Revelation*Party Orientation measure, I
control for a number of confounders.
WoT Casualties
I create a WoT Casualties control variable to account for whether a country that
contributed troops to the WoT incurred casualties during the period between the
election that preceded the revelation of rendition and the election that followed.
I use Marinov et al. (2015) data on troop contributions and casualties regarding
Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force
(two central WoT military operations based in Afghanistan from 2001). Parties
are coded 1 if the country’s troops suffered casualties in these WoT campaigns
(e.g. France), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Belgium). This is the case for 12% of the
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observations (8), but not for the remaining 88% (58). It is anticipated that
parties in office in countries experiencing causalities were more likely to lose at
the election that followed the revelation that they cooperated in RDI operations
because it highlights the human costs of the war effort and points to a larger
foreign policy failure (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992; Zaller, 1992; Bennett and
Paletz, 1994; Berinsky, 2009; Marinov et al., 2015).
Terrorism (log)
I control for Terrorism threat by using the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) GTD (National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016a,b). Given
the international nature of the WoT, I exclude domestic terrorist incidents from
the data and count the number of transnational terrorist incidents in a given
year. I create a continuous variable that takes the natural logarithm of the
total number of transnational terrorist incidents that took place between the
election before the revelation of international cooperation in the RDI programme
in 2006 and the election after (averaged by the number of years between the
two elections).46 A higher value (e.g. Spain) indicates that a state has a greater
terrorism threat and a lower value (e.g. Netherlands) indicates that a state
has a lower terrorism threat. It is expected that states with a higher number
of terrorist events were less likely to be punished by voters for cooperation in
rendition (and lose at the election that followed) because the public understands
that in exceptional circumstances leaders face a pragmatic trade-off between
security and human rights; particularly in contexts that have high terrorism
threat (Ignatieff, 2005; Colaresi, 2014; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014; Wike, 2016).
Rule of Law
I control for Rule of Law by using Kauffman and Kraay (2015) Worldwide
46To account for values of 0 (states that experienced no terrorism attacks) I take the log after adding 1 to the
base, i.e. log(1+x).
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Governance Indicators Project data. I extract data on the Rule of Law from the
election year following the revelation of cooperation in the RDI programme in
2006. This measure captures the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
the police, the courts and the likelihood of crime and violence. This variable is
continuous, with higher scores (e.g. Australia) indicating a strong rule of law and
lower scores indicating a weak rule of law (e.g. Russia). It is predicted that a
government in a country with a strong rule of law were more likely to lose at the
election that followed the revelation that they cooperated in the RDI programme
given the expectation that agents of the state will abide by the rules of society.
This variable is also highly correlated with freedom of the press, which makes it
more likely that citizens will be made aware that their government cooperated in
rendition in the first place.
Economic Growth
I control for Economic Growth by using Hyde and Marinov (2012) National
Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) 4.0 and extract the
variable NELDA 17 that measures whether economic growth in the country
is said to be good running up to the election that followed the revelation of
cooperation in the RDI programme in 2006. This variable is based on perception,
as reported by media sources.47 I construct a dummy variable for this measure.
Parties are coded 1 if economic growth in the country was said to be good (e.g.
Brazil), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Philippines).48 This is the case for 38% of the
observations (23), but not for the remaining 62% (37). It is anticipated that
a party in office during a time where GDP growth rate is good should be less
likely to lose at the election following the rendition revelation because of the
salience of the economy as an issue among voters (Schultz, 1995; Aidt et al., 2011).
47This perception measure is preferred to raw GDP growth as it better represents public opinion on economic
growth as voters are more likely to learn about the state of the economy from media sources as opposed to
studying the figures directly produced by financial institutions such as the World Bank.
48There is complete information on this variable for 60 countries (this excludes Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta from the sample).
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Time in Office (log)
I control for a party’s Time in Office using data from Beck et al. (2015) Database
of Political Institutions. I extract the variable EXECME that provides the name
of the party in office on an annual basis (Beck et al. 2015). I create a continuous
variable that takes the natural logarithm of the number of consecutive years that
a party has been in office at the time of the election that followed the revelation of
cooperation in RDI programme in 2006.49 A higher value indicates that the party
has been in office for a longer time (e.g. Japan) and a lower value indicates that
the party has been in office for a shorter time (e.g. Romania). It is anticipated
that parties that had been in power for a shorter amount of time were more
likely to lose at the election that followed the revelation that they cooperated
in RDI operations as they have less time to gain experience in governance and
demonstrate their competence to voters (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Chan
and Scarritt, 2003).
Table 4.2 displays descriptive statistics of this chapter’s independent and
control variables; including the number of observations (N), mean, standard
deviation, and minimum and maximum values.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables.
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
Revelation 66 0.318 0.469 0 1
Party Orientation 66 0.303 0.463 0 1
Revelation*Party Orientation 66 0.076 0.267 0 1
WoT Casualties 66 0.121 0.329 0 1
Terrorism (log) 66 0.485 0.902 0 3.589
Rule of Law 66 0.241 0.918 -1.118 1.987
Economic Growth 60 0.383 0.490 0 1
Time in Office (log) 66 2.145 0.742 0 3.555
Method
Given that the dependent variable capturing Electoral Defeat is binary, I use a
probit model with robust standard errors. In order to overcome the empirical
limitations associated with the small number of observations in the sample that
49There is no information on party name for Montenegro and Serbia in the data. Therefore, I have used
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems ElectionGuide and Wikipedia to fill in the missing data and
calculate the relevant party’s duration in office.
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cooperated in rendition and were left of centre, I also test the effect of Revela-
tion*Party Orientation on Electoral Defeat when left of centre and centrist parties
are collapsed on the Party Orientation variable.
4.6 Results
The theoretical argument predicts that the political costs of participation in post-
9/11 RDI operations were greater for left of centre parties. The first model in
Table 4.3 only includes the interaction term and its constituent variables; and
displays their effect on Electoral Defeat at the election that followed the revela-
tion of foreign cooperation in these contentious security operations. The second
model includes the two components of the interaction variable (Revelation and
Party Orientation), as well as the control variables. Finally, the third model
presents the full model including the interaction term Revelation*Party Orienta-
tion, its constituent variables (Revelation and Party Orientation), and the control
variables.
The results in Table 4.3 appear to provide empirical support for the hypoth-
esis. However, the statistical significance of the effect of the interaction term
(Revelation*Party Orientation) in the regression table for model 3 is misleading.
When the marginal effect of the interaction term is computed along with its con-
stituent terms (Revelation and Party Orientation), the difference of the predicted
value of 1 and the predicted value at 0 for the dependent variable (Electoral De-
feat) is no longer statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. Under these
conditions, the interaction effect of Revelation*Party Orientation on Electoral De-
feat is 36% with a confidence level of 88%. Given the small number of observations
in the sample with a value of 1 (8%) on the interaction term (i.e. parties that
were caught cooperating in rendition and were left of centre), it is not surprising
that the results in Table 4.3 do not provide significant support for the main hy-
pothesis. However, the results are still worth exploring and nevertheless provide
us with a valuable insight into the factors that make cooperation in contentious
security operations costlier for states. As expected, the direction of the relation-
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Table 4.3: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Interaction Term and
Constituent Variables
Constituent Variables
and Control Variables
Full Model
Revelation -5.024 -0.111 -0.534
(4.343) (0.486) (0.546)
Party Orientation -7.916* -0.640 -1.088**
(4.444) (0.412) (0.495)
Revelation*Party Ori-
entation
1.041 - 1.794*
(8.072) (0.992)
WoT Casualties - -1.220 -1.820*
(0.772) (1.004)
Terrorism (log) - 0.116 0.086
(0.205) (0.213)
Rule of Law - 0.350 0.417
(0.251) (0.259)
Economic Growth - -0.507 -0.497
(0.369) (0.380)
Time in Office (log) - 0.344 0.366
(0.270) (0.278)
Constant 5.586 -0.593 -0.495
(2.369) (0.631) (0.652)
N 60 60 60
LR chi2 3.738 10.019 13.496
Prob>chi2 0.291 0.188 0.020
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.125 0.169
Log Likelihood -38.071 -34.931 -33.192
AIC 84.143 85.861 84.384
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
ship between Revelation*Party Orientation and Electoral Defeat is positive: Left
of centre governments that participated in the RDI programme were more likely
to lose office at the election that followed the revelations in 2006 (as outlined by
the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports).
Model 2 demonstrates that simply being caught for participating in this con-
tentious security programme did not have a detrimental effect on party survival.
However, the direction of the relationship between Revelation and Electoral De-
feat changes dramatically when the party caught was left of centre. The extent
to which a party behaves consistently in public and in private plays an important
part in this narrative. Left of centre governments are expected to be better at
protecting civil liberties in the context of national security than their right of cen-
tre counterparts. Thus, it brought their credibility as a government into question
when it was revealed that they engaged in a secret counterterrorism programme
that violated the rights of CIA detainees. This revelation could have caused lib-
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eral voters to vote for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer
aligned to their own or could have led to a decline in voter turnout in support
of the party. This deterioration in a party’s social respectability could also have
alienated swing voters and caused the median voter to opt for a more viable and
reputable alternative.
The full model (model 3) that includes the interaction term (Revelation*Party
Orientation), its constituent terms (Revelation and Party Orientation) and the
control variables demonstrates the greatest model fit. As previously discussed,
the effect of Revelation*Party Orientation has a positive (but not significant) ef-
fect on Electoral Defeat. However, the two components of the interaction variable
(Revelation and Party Orientation) have an opposite effect on Electoral Defeat
that is negative and significant at the 95% confidence level for Party Orientation
and negative (but not significant) for Revelation. First, this finding demonstrates
that the political costs of being caught for cooperation in rendition was not equal
across all countries. Second, the results show that the period between the election
that preceded the revelation of cooperation in rendition in 2006 and the election
that followed was not a particularly bad time (in general) for left of centre gov-
ernments included in the sample. However, this changes dramatically when the
government that was caught cooperating in rendition was left of centre. Finally,
the WoT Casualties variable has a significant and negative effect on Electoral De-
feat at the 90% confidence level. This is likely because the data structure used for
estimation is cross-sectional and not time series. Previous literature has estab-
lished that incurring casualties during war is costlier for governments when they
take place closer to elections; which is why states tend to reduce troop numbers at
these critical junctures (Marinov et al., 2015). However, governments that suffer
casualties in the battle field – in general – may not necessarily be more prone to
electoral defeat as the public understand that loss of life is an inseparable part of
war. Furthermore, the decision to contribute troops to the WoT could even play
a positive role for these governments as it sends a signal to voters that they are
willing to respond proactively to terrorism threat (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007).
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Figure 4.2 shows the different predicted probabilities of Revelation*Party
Orientation on Electoral Defeat at the election that followed the revelation of
cooperation in the RDI programme with 95% confidence intervals for the unique
combinations of the interaction variable’s constitutent terms. The predicted prob-
abilities are computed by adding the corresponding values of the constituent vari-
ables (Revelation and Party Orientation) to the interaction term while holding all
control variables at their means. The x-axis displays the range of possible values
for Revelation*Party Orientation: Revelation = 1 and Party Orientation = 1;
Revelation = 1 and Party Orientation = 0; Revelation = 0 and Party Orientation
= 1; Revelation = 0 and Party Orientation = 0. The y-axis displays the proba-
bility of Electoral Defeat, ranging from 0 (remained in office) to 1 (was replaced
by another party). From left to right, the first two points display the predicted
probabilities of those parties in the sample that were caught cooperating in rendi-
tion and the final two points display the predicted probabilities of those parties in
the sample that were not. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds
of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.2: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model 3).
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As expected, countries that were caught cooperating in rendition and had
left of centre governments were the most likely group within the sample to be
removed from office (with a predicted probability of Elecotral Defeat at 58%).
Whereas, the predicted probability of Electoral Defeat for a country that was
caught cooperating in rendition but was not left of centre is 31%. The group of
parties least likely to be removed from office in the sample were left of centre
and were not caught participating in rendition (with a predicted probability of
Electoral Defeat at 14%). Whereas, the predicted probability of Electoral Defeat
for a government that was neither caught cooperating in rendition nor was left
of centre is 51%. These empirical findings provide some support for the main
hypothesis that left of centre governments were more likely to incur political costs
for cooperating in the RDI programme relative to right of centre parties. The
difference between the predicted probabilities of Electoral Defeat for left of centre
governments that were caught cooperating in rendition and those that appeared
to have stayed committed to protecting human rights in the context of national
security (and did not cooperate in rendition) are striking – particularly because
the latter group were the most likely type to stay in office at the election that
followed the revelation in 2006. However, it is important to reiterate that the
effect of this exogenous event on domestic voting conditions is not statistically
significant in the probit model displayed in Table 4.3.
I test whether these results are robust using Vote Loss as an alternative mea-
sure for political costs and the results still hold (see Appendix 4.1). However,
the sample size and low number of observations in the sample that cooperated in
rendition and were left of centre place the same restrictions on the conclusions
that can be derived from the model (i.e. the results are still not statistically signif-
icant). As an alternative non-parametric representation of the substantive effect
of Party Orientation on Vote Loss for parties that were caught cooperating in
the RDI programme, Appendix 4.3 includes a histogram of the average Vote Loss
(log) percentages for left of centre parties compared to other parties. The results
show that on average, left of centre governments that were caught cooperating in
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rendition lost twice as many votes than those that were not left of centre.
I further test the robustness of my results by dropping parties from the sample
that were caught cooperating in rendition and were left of centre to ensure that
no single party is driving the results. Appendix 4.4 and 4.5 display the results
from two probit models that test the effect of Revelation*Party Orientation on
Electoral Defeat using one sample that excludes Cyprus (whose government lost
office following the revelation of cooperation in rendition) and one sample that
excludes Portugal (whose government did not lose office following the revelation
of cooperation in rendition) – and the results still hold. However, because there
is such a low number of cases with a value of 1 on the interaction variable (i.e.
the country caught cooperating in rendition had a left of centre government),
when we remove any one of the cases that experienced electoral defeat (in this
case Cyprus), the interaction term effect loses statistical significance at the 90%
confidence level in the regression table.
In order to assess the reason behind the statistically insignificant effect of
Revelation*Party Orientation on Electoral Defeat, I rerun the probit model dis-
played in Table 4.3 using an alternative version of the Party Orientation variable.
Instead of solely focusing on left of centre parties, the new measure collapses left
of centre parties and centrist parties to increase the balance of binary values on
the interaction term Revelation*Party Orientation. An implication of the main
theoretical argument is that the political costs of being caught cooperating in
rendition should be greater for parties ideologically to the left of right of centre
governments because of the perception that they are less likely to trade-off civil
liberties in the context of national security. We should expect this exogenous event
to disproportionately (negatively) effect left of centre and centrist governments in
comparison to right of centre governments because this scandal both reveals an
inconsistency between a party’s private and public type and clashes with liberal
and centrist interests on commitments to human rights in the context of national
security.
The first model in Table 4.4 only includes the alternate version of the in-
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Table 4.4: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat – with Left of Centre and Centrist Parties Col-
lapsed on the Party Orientation Variable.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Interaction Term and
Constituent Variables
Constituent Variables
and Control Variables
Full Model
Revelation -1.4076** -0.128 -1.541
(0.676) (0.492) (0.830)
Party Orientation -1.421*** -0.834** -1.498***
(0.509) (0.415) (0.549)
Revelation*Party Ori-
entation
1.638** - 1.893**
(0.813) (0.907)
WoT Casualties - -1.512* -1.625**
(0.780) (0.824)
Terrorism (log) - 0.161 0.194
(0.211) (0.210)
Rule of Law - 0.291 0.390
(0.250) (0.264)
Economic Growth - -0.495 -0.477
(0.371) (0.388)
Time in Office (log) - 0.133 0.059
(0.273) (0.284)
Constant 0.841* 0.267 0.925
(0.452) (0.780) (0.877)
N 60 60 60
LR chi2 9.052 11.624 16.181
Prob>chi2 0.029 0.114 0.040
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.146 0.203
Log Likelihood -35.414 -34.128 -31.850
AIC 78.829 84.257 81.7
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
teraction term Revelation*Party Orientation and its constitutent variables; and
displays their effect on Electoral Defeat at the election that followed the revela-
tion of foreign cooperation in these contentious security operations. The second
model includes the two components of the alternate version of the interaction vari-
able (Revelation and Party Orientation), as well as the control variables. Finally,
the third model presents the full model including the interaction term Revela-
tion*Party Orientation, its constituent variables (Revelation and Party Orienta-
tion), and the control variables.
As expected, when we pool left of centre parties and centrist parties on the
Party Orientation variable (and improve the balance of the binary values for the
interaction term), both the model fit for the probit regression improves and the
effect of Revelation*Party Orientation on Electoral Defeat becomes statistically
significant (at above the 95% confidence interval) in models 1 and 3. Specifically,
left of centre and centrist governments that were caught cooperating in the RDI
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programme were 47% more likely to be removed from office at the election that
followed the revelations in 2006 (as outlined by the Council of Europe (2006b)
and European Parliament (2006b) reports).
This alternative model specification does not change the direction of the rela-
tionship between any of the control variables and the dependent variable Electoral
Defeat in models 2 and 3 (in relation to the original probit regression displayed in
Table 4.3). Most importantly, we still find that simply being caught for partici-
pating in this contentious security programme did not have a detrimental effect on
party survival (see model 2). However, the direction of the relationship between
Revelation and Electoral Defeat changes dramatically when the party caught was
left of centre or centrist. A plausible explanation for why centrist parties were
more likely to experience greater political costs from being involved in contentious
security cooperation also relates to the perception of party preferences on commit-
ments to civil liberties in the context of national security. Centrist voters prefer
a more moderate approach to governance (Downs, 1957; Aspinwall, 2002; Green,
2007; Treier and Hillygus, 2009). The revelation that a government engaged in
the violation of human rights suggests that they are ideologically positioned fur-
ther to the right than first anticipated. Therefore, we would expect to see the
same theoretical mechanism at work for centrist parties as is the case for left of
centre parties. The revelation that a centrist party cooperated in rendition could
also drive centrist voters to vote for an alternative centrist party whose prefer-
ences they perceive are closer to their own and could also foster a distrust among
politicians and democratic institutions that then leads to a reduction in voter
turnout.
Whilst voter preferences on security and human rights tradeoffs may not be
as clear cut for centrist voters (in comparison to left of centre and right of centre
voters) public opinion surveys on the use of torture in the context of national se-
curity have shown that members of the public, at large, disapprove of it (Opinion,
2006, 2008). This indicates that the average person (i.e. the median voter) should
also be shocked to discover that their government participated in the violation of
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human rights; and could also percieve it is as a grievance. Put differently, the
parties most resilient to an exogenous shock of this kind are right of centre parties
because their traditional voter base is more likely to consider trading off civil lib-
erties in this context and are thus less likely to waiver in their support following
the revelation that the party they support participated in the RDI programme.
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in the post-
9/11 RDI programme? I have argued that states with left of centre governments
suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that
they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security.
Liberal voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties in the name
of national security and would be more likely to perceive the revelation that
their government was complicit in the violation of human rights as a grievance.
Consequently, left of centre parties are more likely to be hurt by a contentious
security scandal as liberal voters disillusioned by the government’s behaviour could
either decide to vote for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer
aligned to their own or withdraw their support altogether A scandal that causes
a deterioration in a party’s social respectability can also alienate swing voters
and cause the median voter to opt for a more viable and reputable alternative.
This theory is consistent with the existing claim that political scandals that reveal
greater differences in a party’s public and private type threaten their survival in
office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government. To test this
hypothesis, I used data on party orientation to explore the political costs of being
caught cooperating in the RDI programme (where "political costs" are defined as
experiencing electoral defeat).
The results from the quantitative analysis provide some empirical support
for my theoretical argument. However, as has been discussed throughout this
chapter, the small sample size and low number of observations with a value of
1 on the interaction variable (i.e. parties that were caught for cooperation and
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were left wing) place strong limitations on the analysis and interpretation of the
results in their current form. Nevertheless, this event study still provides the
field of international relations with a substantive and transparent insight into
the factors that make cooperation in contentious security operations costlier for
states. Moving forward, I aim to develop this chapter by considering alternative
methods suitable for analysing smaller samples including non-parametric Bayesian
techniques.
Given the secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation, many of the re-
search design choices in this chapter have been conservative in order to reduce the
likelihood of identifying false positives (i.e. coding countries that may not have
participated in RDI operations as participating). For example, the first compo-
nent of the interaction term, Revelation, is constructed according to whether a
country was described as cooperating in the RDI programme by the Council of
Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports so that country coop-
eration is measured using the same comprehensive high profile sources and thus
we can be more confident that those countries cooperated and that members of
the public were aware of these allegations. However, it is important to note that
some time passed between the first news reports concerning RDI operations at the
end of 2005 and the release of these intergovernmental reports in 2006. This leads
to the possibility that the main empirical model might fail to capture earlier (and
perhaps stronger) reactions to the revelation itself during this time period when
elections in some countries took place. However, if anything, this issue is more
likely to bias the results against finding support for this chapter’s main hypothesis
and makes the findings even more compelling (by capturing an effect that is likely
within the lower bounds of electoral defeat).
An additional feature of the research design that warrants further discussion
includes a potential selection issue that could bias the results in this chapter. In
the current format, the sample size is conceptually divided into a treatment group
(countries that cooperated in RDI and were caught) and a control group (countries
that did not cooperate and thus were not caught). However, the clandestine na-
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ture of counterterrorism cooperation means that we cannot be certain that a third
group of countries does not exist (that cooperated in RDI but were not caught).
While this concern is theoretically possible, it is important to note that there has
been no evidence over the last 12 years to suggest that this special group of coun-
tries exists in reality. Moreover, given the incentives to shift the blame to another
country, it would be surprising if countries that did cooperate (and were caught)
neglected the opportunity to reveal the identity of those countries they knew co-
operated (but were not caught) once the information on foreign complicity in RDI
was out. Similarly, it would be unusual if detainees, former intelligence officals
and country ambassadors had neglected the opportunity to name and shame all
of the countries that they knew participated during interviews by European inter-
governmental investigations, government and parliamentary inquiries, NGOs and
Investigative Journalists (European Parliament, 2006a; Council of Europe, 2008;
All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; United Na-
tions, 2010; Reprieve and Access Info, 2011). If anything, this possibility presents
a bias in the results that makes it less likely to find support for the main hypoth-
esis, given the small the number of countries that were caught and were left wing,
in comparison to those that were not. While these empirical constraints mean that
there is no way of modelling this third group given the current research design, a
future extension of this chapter could be to test the main hypothesis under exper-
imental conditions to see whether left of centre voters are more likely to withdraw
support for a political party based on information that they were involved in the
violation of human rights.
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4.8 Appendicies
Appendix 4.1: Linear Regression, Vote Loss (log).
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Interaction Term and
Constituent Variables
Constituent Variables
and Control Variables
Full Model
Revelation -0.658 -0.246 -0.557
(0.416) (0.471) (0.515)
Party Orientation -0.664 -0.362 -0.671
(0.405) (0.389) (0.443)
Revelation*Party Ori-
entation
1.156 - 1.185
(0.767) (0.837)
WoT Casualties - 0.260 0.103
(0.634) (0.638)
Terrorism (log) - -0.026 -0.075
(0.193) (0.194)
Rule of Law - -0.127 -0.082
(0.243) (0.243)
Economic Growth - -0.019 0.024
(0.354) (0.352)
Time in Office (log) - 0.095 0.079
(0.260) (0.257)
Constant 1.207 0.890 1.042*
(0.234) (0.614) (0.617)
N 60 60 60
R2 0.067 0.036 0.073
Adjusted R2 0.017 -0.094 -0.073
Residual Standard Er-
ror
1.238 (df = 56) 1.306 (df = 52) 1.293 (df = 51)
F Statistic 1.331 (df = 3; 56) 0.279 (df = 7; 52) 0.500 (df = 8; 51)
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Appendix 4.2: Coding of Party Orientation Variable for the Main Interaction Variable (Left of
Centre) and the Alternative Version of the Interaction Variable (Left of Centre or Centrist).
Country Party Left of Centre Left of Centre or Centrist
Australia LPA No No
Bahamas PLP No Yes
Barbados BLP Yes Yes
Belgium VLD No No
Belize PUP No No
Benin independent No Yes
Botswana BDP No No
Brazil PT Yes Yes
Cape Verde PAICV Yes Yes
Chile CPD Yes Yes
Colombia independent No Yes
Croatia HDZ No No
Cyprus DIKO Yes Yes
Denmark V No No
Dominican Republic PLD No Yes
El Salvador ARENA No No
France UMP No No
Georgia UNM No Yes
Ghana NPP No No
Greece ND No No
Guatemala GANA No No
Guyana PPP Yes Yes
Honduras PL No No
Hungary MSzP Yes Yes
Iceland IP No Yes
India INC Yes Yes
Indonesia PD No Yes
Ireland Fianna Fail No Yes
Jamaica PNP Yes Yes
Japan LDP No No
Kenya NARC No Yes
Lesotho LCD Yes Yes
Luxembourg PCS No Yes
Macedonia SDSM Yes Yes
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Madagascar TIM No Yes
Mali independent No Yes
Malta NP No No
Mauritius MSM No Yes
Mexico PAN No No
Moldova PCRM Yes Yes
Mongolia MPRP No Yes
Montenegro DPSM No Yes
Mozambique Frelimo Yes Yes
Namibia SWAPO Yes Yes
Nepal NC No Yes
Netherlands CDA No No
New Zealand Labour Party Yes Yes
Panama PRD No Yes
Papua New Guinea NAP No Yes
Paraguay Colorado No No
Philippines Lakas-CMD No Yes
Portugal PS Yes Yes
Romania independent No Yes
Russia independent No Yes
Senegal PDS Yes Yes
Serbia DPS No Yes
Slovenia SDS No Yes
South Africa ANC No Yes
South Korea Uri Party No Yes
Spain PSOE Yes Yes
Taiwan DPP No No
Trinidad and Tobago PNM No No
Turkey AKP No Yes
Ukraine independent No Yes
United Kingdom Labour Yes Yes
Uruguay EP-FA Yes Yes
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Appendix 4.3: Average Percentage of Vote Loss for Countries Caught Cooperating in Rendition
Based on Party Orientation.
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parties versus parties that are not left of centre (divided by the total number of observations for each group).
107
Appendix 4.4: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat - Excluding Cyprus from the Sample.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Interaction Term and
Constituent Variables
Constituent Variables
and Control Variables
Full Model
Revelation -5.024 -0.405 -0.538
(4.343) (0.522) (0.545)
Party Orientation -7.916* -0.937** -1.090**
(4.444) (0.456) (0.494)
Revelation*Party Ori-
entation
6.196 - 1.060
(8.912) (1.133)
WoT Casualties - -0.884 -1.302
(0.798) (0.979)
Terrorism (log) - 0.177 0.130
(0.210) (0.215)
Rule of Law - 0.330 0.368
(0.256) (0.262)
Economic Growth - -0.672* -0.612
(0.388) (0.397)
Time in Office (log) - 0.426 0.406
(0.280) (0.281)
Constant 2.265 -0.658 0.565
(2.369) (0.641) (0.653)
N 59 59 59
LR chi2 4.024 12.31 13.095
Prob>chi2 0.259 0.091 0.109
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.158 0.168
Log Likelihood -36.956 -32.812 -32.420
AIC 81.911 81.624 82.841
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
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Appendix 4.5: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat - Excluding Portugal from the Sample.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Interaction Term and
Constituent Variables
Constituent Variables
and Control Variables
Full Model
Revelation -5.024 -0.405 -0.538
(4.343) (0.522) (0.545)
Party Orientation -7.916* -0.937** -1.090**
(4.444) (0.456) (0.494)
Revelation*Party Ori-
entation
1.294 - 1.886*
(8.501) (0.980)
WoT Casualties - -1.139 -1.566
(0.792) (0.995)
Terrorism (log) - 0.103 0.040
(0.207) (0.260)
Rule of Law - 0.341 0.400
(0.252) (0.260)
Economic Growth - -0.515 -0.508
(0.369) (0.380)
Time in Office (log) - 0.347 0.371
(0.269) (0.277)
Constant 3.003 -0.598 -0.485
(2.369) (0.630) (0.649)
N 59 59 59
LR chi2 3.945 9.214 13.043
Prob>chi2 0.267 0.238 0.110
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.117 0.165
Log Likelihood -37.479 -34.845 -32.930
AIC 82.958 85.689 83.86
Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 ’***’, p≤ 0.05 ’**’, p≤ 0.1 ’*’ with Standard Errors in parentheses.
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5 Conclusion
The three preceeding chapters sought both to theoretically study and empirically
test the causes and consequences of international security cooperation on sensitive
issues during the post-9/11 period. In the first chapter of this thesis, I offered a
novel solution for measuring partially observed processes such as repression and
human rights violations with a specific focus on international cooperation in the
RDI programme. Due to the secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation, previ-
ous research on this topic has been plagued by uncertainty, an absence of data and
systematic empirical evidence (Efrat, 2015; Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010). As
a consequence, it has remained unclear just how many countries participated in
RDI operations – and to what extent. To overcome the limitations of identifying
rendition flights and the countries likely involved, I applied data pre-processing
method to the world’s largest collection of public flight data possibly related to
rendition (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b). The central finding from this section
includes the identification on an additional 307 rendition flights and 15 countries
potentially involved, beyond the 54 known cases.
The second chapter of this thesis considered how common interests on hu-
man rights and national security can inform patterns of international cooperation
on sensitive issues under conditions of secrecy. I focused on the example of in-
ternational cooperation in the RDI programme to demonstrate how states are
able to analyse one another’s preferences on these issue areas in order to identify
which countries are more likely to cooperate with them on contentious security
matters. The empirical findings from this section supported the idea that coun-
tries with similar preferences to the U.S. on human rights were the most desirable
rendition partners as they are more likely to view security dilemmas and human
rights trade-offs in a similar light. Countries with closely aligned preferences and
a vested interest in the outcomes of cooperation are more reliable as they are less
likely to disclose classified information (based on legal or moral grounds) that is
detrimental to the group (Kydd, 2005). This screening process plays a particu-
larly important role when the costs of someone uncovering the operations include
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revealing confidential plans to the enemy and causing a political backlash at home
that can threaten the survival of the leaders and governments involved.
In the third chapter of this thesis, I explored the conditions under which being
caught for cooperation on a sensitive issue (that involves the violation of human
rights) is politically costly. Focusing again on cooperation in RDI operations
during the post 9/11 period, I argued that the political costs of a revelation of this
nature are greater for those countries whose behaviour is perceived to be a more
profound contradiction of their preferences on human rights and national security
trade-offs. The main finding from this section is that being caught for cooperation
in extraordinary rendition had a disproportionate negative effect on left of centre
governments (with a greater chance of them experiencing electoral defeat following
the revelation). I explain how this result is a consequence of the perception that
left of centre governments are better at protecting civil liberties in the context
of national security (Welch and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al.,
2014). This revelation demonstrated a greater conflict of interests between left of
centre parties and their supporter base as liberal voters are less likely to consider
trading off civil liberties at the expense of national security. This could plausibly
have led to liberal voters voting for a different party at the following election whose
preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own or could have caused some
supporters to withdraw from voting altogether (Downs, 1957; Davis et al., 1970;
Converse, 1966; Citrin et al., 1975; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver,
2003; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004; Trubowitz and Mellow, 2005; Jessee, 2009).
This thesis makes a substantive contribution to the field of international rela-
tions by explaining the sources and implications of secret and controversial forms
of international cooperation during the post-9/11 period. The main findings have
demonstrated how the tension between common interests and conflicting interests
on issues such as security and human rights is important for understanding how
international security cooperation under conditions of secrecy works. In addition,
the perception of political ideology and preferences on security and human rights
trade-offs are a significant factor in determining which countries are more likely
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to be hurt for cooperating on a sensitive issue in the area of international security.
A striking finding from the preceding two chapters is that core international
relations theories fail to fully explain the form of counterterrorism cooperation
studied in this thesis. On the one hand, the secret and sensitive nature of RDI
operations imposed an entirely different dynamic on alliance formation that re-
quired the U.S. to be far more selective beyond its usual cooperation partners.
And on the other hand, the WoT has seen some democratic governments make
foreign policy decisions that contradict conventional wisdom that liberal demo-
cratic institutions are more effective at constraining the behaviour of government
officials and are better at ensuring the protection of human rights.
“Let no one be in any doubt that the rules of the game are changing”
(Blair, 2005).
The main findings summarise above are novel and together provide a broader
template for both detecting human rights violations that take place in secret and
predicting which countries are a) likely to engage in similar kinds of repressive
behaviour in secret and b) incur domestic penalties for their involvement when
the costs of being caught are high. First, this thesis makes a unique contribution
to academia and the policy world by bridging the gap between theory from inter-
national relations literature and empirical research on rendition. The discovery
that a quarter of the world’s countries (including many established democracies)
had been cooperating with the U.S. in an illegal rendition programme elicited
mainstream media coverage, public debates back home and condemnation from
the international community (Bonini, 2006; Cameron, 2006; Kirk, 2006). How-
ever, despite the salience of this issue, political scientists have paid little attention
to the topic of rendition. This thesis has provided a first account of the causes,
dynamics and consequences of international cooperation in this sensitive area of
international politics from a quantitative perspective. In addition, the empirical
contribution of a new and improved rendition indicator that provides a more ac-
curate estimate of international cooperation can help facilitate further studies on
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this subject by academic researchers and human rights practitioners.
Second, the innovative approach adopted by this thesis that utilises public
flight data, detainee testimonies and NGO reports has made it possible to study
theoretically interesting questions on controversial international security cooper-
ation that is usually off limits given the topic’s inherent secret nature. The main
findings from this thesis are generalizable beyond the issue of extraordinary ren-
dition and can be used to scientifically evaluate other forms of cooperation in
international security. For example, the predictive model used to identify inter-
national cooperation in extraordinary rendition from the first chapter provides a
prototype for how challenging international politics and human rights events can
be studied using insight from matching data mining analyses. Similarly, the sim-
ple theoretical framework on preference similarity developed in the second chapter
can be applied to other areas of international politics to make sense of coopera-
tion patterns where collaboration with traditional alliance partners may not the
be the most practical option. Likewise, the model of party orientation advanced
in the third chapter can also be applied to other sub-fields in politics in order to
predict which types of external events are more likely to disrupt a stable political
environment and threaten the tenure of a politician or government.
Third, the key findings from this thesis have important policy implications
for the promotion of human rights and the counterterrorism methods employed
during the post-9/11 period. For example, the results from the first chapter can
be useful for NGOs interested in using the rendition flight data for advocacy pur-
poses; particularly where previous efforts have failed to hold states account due
to a lack of evidence. The identification of 15 new countries potentially involved
in the RDI programme, could have important legal implications for the concerned
states if it is proven that they knowingly participated in or condoned rendition.
Since the publication of this chapter in the International Area Studies Review, I
have received requests from human rights litigators, policy experts and NGOs in
the U.S. to use the data for policy and advocacy purposes. Similarly, civil society
continues to be interested in the methods that can be undertaken to prevent hu-
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man rights abuses. The second chapter of this thesis demonstrates how measures
of state preferences on human rights (e.g. public data on UN voting records) can
be used as a tool to predict which countries are more likely to trade-off civil liber-
ties for national security during the post-9/11 period in the future. This suggests
that these findings could help NGOs and investigative researchers dedicated to
the promotion of human rights in the context of counterterrorism to narrow their
focus on a number of ‘at risk’ countries. Equally, the main findings from the third
chapter highlight the current failure of democratic institutions designed to prevent
repressive policies on national security from taking place and hold governments
accountable that engage in such behaviour. This indicates that policy organi-
sations may want to turn their attention to strengthening the institutional and
legal frameworks that have failed to prevent human rights being violated through
national security cooperation.
While this thesis has found empirical support for newly developed arguments
in the theoretical literature of international cooperation, there are a number of av-
enues for future research that can help broaden our understanding of cooperation
in sensitive areas of international politics. For instance, it would be interesting
to see whether the political and socio-economic sources of secret security cooper-
ation change when cooperation is treated as a categorical or continuous variable.
For example, state participation in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period
was far from uniform and involved countries participating in a varying number of
ways. However, this thesis only focuses on the causes and dynamics of cooperation
at a binary level; i.e. what caused countries to cooperate (period) and not what
caused some states to engage in some practices but not others. Along the same
lines, it would be useful to look at whether the consequences of being caught for
security cooperation on a sensitive issue (that included the violation of human
rights) are worse for countries that engage more regularly or engage in a wider
array of repressive acts.
On a broader level, it would be worthwhile to look at similar instances of
cooperation on sensitive areas of international politics to see whether the theoret-
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ical frameworks advanced by this thesis still hold. Some examples might include
cooperation on controversial arms trade deals, cooperation on countering cyber
terrorism, cooperation on the war on drugs, and cooperation on combatting anti-
human trafficking networks etc.. More generally, the global campaign that gave
rise to RDI practices (the WoT) is still ongoing with political leaders from some
of the main countries involved indicating that national security will continue to
take precedence over human rights:
“I’m clear: if human rights laws get in the way of tackling extremism and
terrorism, we will change those laws to keep British people safe” (May, 2017).
“When ISIS is doing things that nobody has ever heard of since medieval
times. Would I feel strongly about waterboarding. As far as I’m concerned
we have to fight fire with fire” (Trump, 2017).
Furthermore, the post-9/11 era also coincides with an increase in access to
big data that can be used to study future international security and human rights
events that are usually hidden by secrecy.
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